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Legal scholarship portrays women as reproductive decision makers 
in conflicting ways.  The distinctions between depictions of infertile 
women and women considering abortion are particularly striking.  
A woman seeking infertility treatment, even one who faces no legal 
obstacles, is often portrayed as so emotionally distraught and despe-
rate that her ability to give informed consent is potentially compro-
mised.  Yet, the legal academy has roundly rejected similar stereo-
types of pregnant women considering abortion, depicting them as 
confident and competent decision makers.  This Article argues that 
legal scholars’ use of a “desperate woman” stereotype denies women’s 
ability to critically assess the health risks and life benefits of fertility 
treatments, particularly when similar stereotypes have been met with 
scorn in the abortion context.  These constructions perpetuate emo-
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tional paternalism; undermine the dignity, autonomy, and capacity 
of infertile women; and justify restrictions on decision making in the 
Assisted Reproductive Technology context.  Infertility may well pro-
duce emotional distress; however, the construction of infertile women 
as governed by desperation unnecessarily impugns their capacity for 
autonomous decision making.  To these ends, this Article examines 
the contributions that emotion can make to autonomous decision 
making, and the need for a more relational model of autonomy that 
acknowledges the socially embedded nature of treatment decisions.  
Because current constructions of “desperate” infertile women ignore 
available clinical research and have serious ideological and practic-
al consequences, it is crucial to unmask and reframe them to prevent 
them from being incorporated into jurisprudence or legislation.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On January 26, 2009, Nadya Suleman, an unemployed single 
mother of six who was receiving public assistance,1 gave birth to oc-
tuplets conceived through in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) using donated 
sperm.2  Suleman’s story engendered profound controversy.  She was 
criticized for consenting to transfer twelve embryos,3 and her repro-
ductive endocrinologist, Dr. Michael Kamrava, eventually lost his Cali-
fornia medical license after the state medical board ruled he had 
been grossly negligent “for an excessive number of embryo transfers” 
despite the fact that Kamrava believed the transfer was driven by 
Suleman’s wishes.4
Shortly after the Suleman story broke, fertility clinics across the 
United States were intensely scrutinized,
   
5 spurring legislative attempts 
to preempt women and their doctors from making similar decisions 
in the future.  In Georgia, the proposed “Ethical Treatment of Hu-
man Embryos Act” declared a living embryo to be a “biological hu-
man being” that could not be destroyed and restricted the number of 
embryos that could be created and transferred in an IVF cycle.6  The 
Georgia Senate eventually passed an amended form of the bill stating 
that IVF embryos can only be created to initiate pregnancy.7
 
 1. Kimi Yoshino & Jessica Garrison, Octuplets’ Care Could End Up Costing Taxpayers Mil-
lions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at B1. 
  Missouri 
legislators considered a similar measure providing that physicians 
 2. Donor Wants DNA Test for Octuplets, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2009, at 13. 
 3. See, e.g., Suleman Says She Was Drugged When She Consented to 12 Embryos, CNN (July 
29, 2011, 7:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/SHOWBIZ/07/28/california.octomom 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Suleman Says] (noting that Suleman claims she has 
received death threats and is hated in her hometown).  In IVF, a certain number of ferti-
lized embryos (typically ranging from one to four) are transferred back into the intended 
mother’s uterus. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY: 
THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 31 (2004).  Much of the controversy 
stemmed from rumors that Suleman elected to transfer six embryos (two of which split 
into identical twins).  Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Focus on Fertility Industry and 
Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at A1.    
 4. Suleman Says, supra note 3. 
 5. See Saul, supra note 3. 
 6. S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009).  The act stated that “[i]n the 
interest of reducing the risk of complications for both the mother and the transferred in 
vitro human embryos, including the risk of preterm birth associated with higher-order 
multiple gestations,” doctors could only create the number of in vitro embryos in a single 
cycle as were permitted to be transferred in that cycle; women under 40 using their own 
eggs could have a maximum of two embryos transferred per cycle, those over 40 using 
their own eggs could transfer three, and women using donor eggs or adopted embryos 
could transfer two regardless of age.  Id. 
 7. Id. 
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could transfer only as many embryos as recommended by the Ameri-
can Society for Reproductive Medicine.8
Though these proposed acts were explicitly concerned with the 
ethics of assisted reproductive technologies, implicit in each is the ar-
gument that women and their physicians cannot be trusted to make 
ethically correct decisions regarding when to undergo IVF and how 
many embryos to transfer.  Such legislation is also problematic be-
cause it undermines doctors’ treatment discretion and thwarts custo-
mization of IVF protocols, which could have dire consequences when 
it is medically necessary for a woman to have more than two or three 
embryos transferred. 
   
The controversy surrounding how and why Suleman conceived 
her octuplets and the legislation this strange incident inspired illu-
strates how women’s reproductive potential induces trepidation and 
disquiet in contemporary society and exemplifies how women’s sex-
uality has become decoupled from reproduction, intensifying ques-
tions of ethics and morality.9  This incident also implicates historical 
Western social and scientific conceptions of women as excessively 
emotional beings with questionable decision-making ability.10  While 
wholesale assaults on women’s rationality have ebbed, these doubts 
regularly reemerge when reproduction is at issue, justifying the impo-
sition of tight social controls upon their reproductive capacities and 
decision-making opportunities.11
 
 8. See H.B. 810, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2009). 
  Such constraints are imposed even 
today, when the traditional individualistic and cognitive conception of 
informed consent—that patients are rational, autonomous beings ca-
 9. Fertility treatments such as IVF are often perceived as “messing with nature” or at-
tempting to “alter God’s will.”  See James Chapman, The Fatherless Baby, DAILY MAIL (Lon-
don), July 11, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2648874 (reporting that some experts think 
new developments in somatic cell transfers are “messing with nature”); Carl H. Coleman, 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Constitution, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57, 58–59 
(2003) (noting that procreation through assisted reproductive technologies (“ART”) poses 
significant problems from a religious perspective); Diane Eicher, High-Tech Moms, DENVER 
POST, May 14, 1995, at 10 (stating that some religious groups object to assisted reproduc-
tion as going “against God’s will”); Andy Lines, Triplets Who Are Aged 9, 6, and 2, MIRROR 
(London), Dec. 29, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 4936875 (reporting the criticism a mar-
ried couple endured from friends who described their “decision to have test-tube babies as 
‘messing with nature’”); Keith Suter, Blessings Born by the Way of Science, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(Sydney), Jan. 16, 2006, at 22, available at 2006 WLNR 823947 (describing the Catholic 
Church’s view that scientists should “not try to play God” by performing procedures using 
ART); Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of 
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1514, 1523 (2008) (noting that some have criticized IVF “for altering the natural process 
of reproduction and separating sex from procreation”). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 173–174. 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
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pable of reaching appropriate decisions about their own medical 
treatment12—is under assault, and when there is a growing awareness 
of emotion’s role in decision making.13
Moreover, women making reproductive decisions in one context, 
such as infertility, may face stereotypes that have been challenged or 
rebutted in another context, such as abortion.  Infertile women are 
scarcely the only population seen as “reproductively troubled” and 
that faces particularly complex ethical and moral questions and po-
tential social stigma; women carrying unwanted pregnancies have also 
long been in the spotlight of controversy.  At first glance, an infertile 
woman attempting to conceive through assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (“ART”) and a fertile woman considering abortion appear to 
be diametric opposites, individuals with clearly contradictory needs 
and priorities.  One wants a child; the other does not. One cannot 
conceive a child; the other can.  Abortion in the United States in-
spires regulatory schemes; IVF, until recently, has not.   
   
Closer examination, however, reveals many important similarities 
between women in these two situations.  Both may be perceived as 
emotional or desperate.  Both acquire the liminal role of medical pa-
tient, a status that is simultaneously empowering and subordinating; 
 
 12. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Ought We to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Deci-
sional Competence?, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 377, 378–79 (1998) (“Contemporary ideas of 
competence are tied inextricably to the ideal of self-determination in modern Western 
societies.  Such societies are committed to respect for individual choice, both as a good in 
its own right and on the grounds that each person knows best what choices will maximize 
his or her own welfare.”).   
 13. See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, 
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998); Louis C. Charland, Appreciation and Emotion: 
Theoretical Reflections on the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 
359, 359–61 (1998) (arguing that the concept of appreciation, “an essential ingredient of 
competence,” requires emotion).  These efforts have resulted in a growing awareness of 
emotion’s effects upon decisionmaking, and rumblings of discontent among advocates of 
cognitive theories of competence.  To these ends, some scholars challenge the very no-
tions of autonomy and rationality.  See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra, at 47–108, (problematizing 
autonomy and stating that no truly rational decision is possible).  A few suggest that many 
patients genuinely prefer to have doctors or family members make decisions for them.  Id. 
at 35–46, 85–87 (discussing quantitative and qualitative research suggesting that not all 
patients want to make their own decisions, and their reasons for doing so).  Still others 
question whether even rational individuals can reach reasoned decisions in the face of 
emotionally trying circumstances, and would support intrusions on patient autonomy to 
override what they see as ill-considered choices.  Id. at 63 (stating that decisions may be 
“warped” by various emotions); id. at 89–90 (stating that sometimes patients have been 
thankful when physicians persisted in treatment that went against their wishes).  See also 
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 267 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2221, 2221 (1992) (discussing various models of physician-patient rela-
tionships, including a paternalistic model of the physician-patient relationship where the 
physician decides what is best).      
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one may seek or refuse medical treatment, but at the same time one is 
grouped with the “unwell” and vulnerable.  Most significantly, howev-
er, both seek to alter the “natural” course of fertility and attempt to 
use reproductive technologies to make significant reproductive 
choices about how to deal with crises—achieving, or avoiding, mo-
therhood.   
Although they share many similarities, these two populations 
have received different treatment in legal scholarship; stereotypes of 
desperate women as irrational decision makers have been roundly re-
jected in the abortion context but not necessarily in the infertility 
context.  There has been a robust, passionate defense of pregnant 
women’s ability to choose abortion; legal scholarship resounds with 
sharp criticism of the problematic “woman-protective” discourse on 
abortion that claims that women are predisposed toward mother-
hood, cannot rationally elect to terminate fetal life, and must be sub-
ject to informational disclosures and reflective periods before giving 
“informed consent” to abortion.14  But there have been only isolated 
attempts to defend infertile women’s decision-making capacity,15 and 
some legal scholars have relied upon stereotypes similar to those re-
jected in the abortion context.  These scholars claim that, for infertile 
women “desperate”16 to conceive, “[t]he power of wishful thinking 
obscures rational deliberation,” rendering them incapable of weigh-
ing the risks and benefits of treatment.17  Such assertions overemphas-
ize the importance of the decision maker and her characteristics at 
the cost of a more thorough inquiry into her decision and its quality, 
and may underestimate or disregard emotion’s role in autonomous, 
competent decision making.  Moreover, there is little evidence that 
emotion, even desperation, is as problematic as scholars suggest; clin-
ical research belies any claim that distress leads to incapacity,18 and 
concludes that patients are most likely to experience severe emotional 
distress not at the pre-treatment stage of informed consent but after 
multiple unsuccessful treatment cycles, if at all.19
It is understandable that, to date, scholars have focused their 
energies and resources on combating more imminent and dangerous 
   
 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 116–119. 
 15. For instance, at legal conferences academics have begun to refer to Nadya Sule-
man by her legal name instead of the more derogatory “Octomom” as a sign of respect.   
 16. Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A Call For New 
Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 275 (2003). 
 17. Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
897, 923 (2000). 
 18. See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.  
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 202–205. 
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threats of regulatory and judicial constraints on abortion decision 
making.  What feminist scholars have accomplished in the abortion 
context—a thorough repudiation of images of women as unfit deci-
sion makers20
To these ends, this Article will make two major contributions.  
First, it will establish that infertile women are autonomous and com-
petent decision makers, despite the fact that they experience numer-
ous emotions, perhaps including desperation, due to the emotionally 
challenging nature of infertility and infertility treatment.
—must now be accomplished in the infertility context.  
The need to reject gendered, inaccurate, even offensive images of 
women as decision makers is reason enough to make such changes.  
But recent legislative efforts and the potential for future regulatory 
action render this issue even more urgent.  We must take a hard look 
at the types of legislation that have been and are likely to be intro-
duced, scrutinizing the limits they would place on women’s decision 
making as well as the understandings of women as decision makers 
that underlie them.   
21  Second, 
this Article will argue in favor of acknowledging and incorporating 
the value of emotional elements in competent decision making.22  
Our attention must be refocused from the decision maker and her 
emotions to the quality of the decision itself, as well as to the broader 
questions of emotion and its relationship to rationality, autonomy, 
and competence.23  We need not reject the contention that infertile 
women experience desperation.  Rather, we must reject the insinua-
tion that desperation and other emotions warp infertile women’s au-
tonomy and decision making competency.  Desperation—whatever its 
characteristics and however strongly it is felt—must be decoupled 
from irrationality.24
Part II of this Article will explicate how and why contemporary 
characterizations of infertile women conflict so profoundly with legal 
constructions of women with unwanted pregnancies.  It will first de-




 20. See infra note 
  
Thereafter, it will contrast these paternalistic characterizations with 
feminist legal scholars’ empowering depictions of pregnant women 
considering abortion that have evolved in reaction to legislative and 
132 and accompanying text.  
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
 22. See infra Part III.C–D. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See infra Part III.D. 
 25. See infra Part II.A. 
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judicial constraints on the abortion decision.26  Finally, it will explore 
possible reasons for the strong tensions between these two construc-
tions of women as reproductive decision makers.27
In Part III, this Article will argue that these constructions of in-
fertile women are scientifically and pragmatically inaccurate.  These 
depictions are contradicted by clinical psychological and psychiatric 
research that acknowledges a link between infertility and emotional 
distress, but does not correlate distress with incompetence.
   
28  In addi-
tion, these constructions are disrespectful of women’s reproductive 
autonomy; like fertile women, infertile women can freely choose to 
attempt to conceive a child.29  Finally, such portrayals misconstrue the 
productive role that emotion can play in reproductive and medical 
decision making for all women.30
In Part IV, this Article will discuss the grave consequences of al-
lowing current constructions of infertile women in legal scholarship 
to stand unchallenged.  Drawing upon sociological theory, it will doc-
ument how failing to combat protectionist portrayals of infertile 
women inevitably reinforces paternalistic attitudes toward women and 
reproductive decision making found in mainstream society.   
   
II.    WOMAN INEPT, WOMAN ADEPT: CONFLICTING LEGAL IMAGES OF 
WOMEN’S DECISION-MAKING AUTONOMY 
A.  Infertile Women in Legal Scholarship 
While problematic constructions of pregnant women as inferior 
decision makers originated primarily in state and federal legislation 
and judicial decisions,31
 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 constructions of infertile women as poor de-
 27. See infra Part II.C. 
 28. See infra Part III.A. 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. See infra Part III.C. 
 31. See infra Part II.B.  Only recently legislation has been proposed that would con-
strain infertile women’s decision making (primarily by limiting how many embryos may be 
transferred in a cycle). See, e.g., H.B. 810, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2009) (limiting 
the number of embryos that a physician may implant according to recommendations set 
forth by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine).  Other forms of state legisla-
tion affirmatively encourage citizens to access fertility treatment, such as provisions that 
mandate that health insurance cover treatment procedures and medications, often includ-
ing multiple cycles of intra-uterine insemination (“IUI”) and IVF.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 23-85-137 (Supp. 2011), § 23-86-118 (2004) (requiring insurance companies to in-
clude IVF as a covered expense); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008) 
(mandating coverage for treatment of infertility, but excluding IVF from mandatory cov-
erage); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 and § 38a-509 (West 2007) (requiring insurance 
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cision makers are found predominantly in legal scholarship.  This li-
terature questions infertility patients’ decision making in a handful of 
contexts, including whether strong emotions warp decisions to un-
dergo fertility treatment,32 whether patients can adequately compre-
hend treatment risks and benefits,33 and whether patients can cogent-
ly decide matters such as embryo disposition in the event of death or 
divorce prior to an IVF cycle.34  Common law courts—the usual arbi-
ters of legal competency—have been largely silent as to the legal im-
plications of infertile individuals’ emotional condition; no published 
case has invalidated IVF informed consent or embryo disposition 
forms on the grounds of parties’ emotional distress, desperation, or 
other strong emotion.35
Legal scholars who describe the emotional effects of infertility at 
best recognize the affective dimensions of fertility treatment and at 
worst depict these factors as overwhelming reason, free will, and per-
haps even the capacity for informed consent.  Such scholars usually 
acknowledge infertility’s considerable emotional consequences, par-
ticularly depression.
   
36
 
companies to cover the medically necessary expenses related to infertility treatment, in-
cluding, but not limited to “ovulation induction, intrauterine insemination, in-vitro fertili-
zation, uterine embryo lavage, embryo transfer, gamete intra-fallopian transfer, zygote in-
tra-fallopian transfer and low tubal ovum transfer”); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m 
(West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
175, § 47H, ch. 176A, § 8K, ch. 176B, § 4J, ch. 176G, § 4 (West Supp. 2011); 211 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 37.04-37.05 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17:48-6x, 17:48A-7w, 17:48E-35.22 (West 2008), 17B:27-46.1x (West 2006); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3216 (13), § 3221 (6),  § 4303 (McKinney Supp. 2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-v 
(McKinney Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01(A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2009); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30, 
  They recognize that IVF patients experience 
§ 27-19-23, § 27-20-20, § 27-41-33 (2006); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 
§ 1366.001-1366.07 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 48–53. 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 55–58.  
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 60–64. 
 35. Only one case addresses infertile individuals’ vulnerability, and does so in dicta: In 
United States v. Stover, 93 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1996), a criminal appeal involving adoption 
fraud, the government argued that “many of defendants’ victims had problems with infer-
tility and suffered the attendant emotional effects of that condition,” and that the defen-
dants “targeted those clients’ emotional vulnerability by promising a ‘quick fix.’”  Id. at 
1383–84.  The government asked the appeals court to uphold a vulnerable victims sen-
tencing enhancement even though the district court “fail[ed] to cite the infertility of some 
of the victims as a ground for finding unusual vulnerability.”  Id. at 1384.  Finding that in-
fertile parents looking to adopt were not vulnerable victims as a class, the Eighth Circuit 
left the door open a crack for future cases: “given the proper set of facts, a person’s infer-
tility, if known to the defendant, might support a finding of particular susceptibility to 
adoption-related fraud.”  Id. at 1388. 
 36. Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2004) (“In numerous psychological studies, researchers have 
found that infertile women frequently suffer from severe depression.”).  
 348 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:339 
“extreme emotional distress” before and during infertility diagnoses,37 
and state that undergoing long-term infertility treatments can exhaust 
emotional, physical, and financial resources.38  They note that infer-
tile couples experience loss of control, stress, anger, stigma, isolation, 
self-doubt, guilt, lowered self-esteem, and impaired health, relation-
ships, and ambitions,39 all symptoms contributing to depression.40  
They portray the struggle to overcome infertility as an all-consuming 
quest: “It is almost as if the infertile couple is emotionally trapped un-
til a healthy child is born.”41  And they make a number of problematic 
claims: that infertile women’s emotions render them particularly vul-
nerable to fraud and manipulation, and that these emotions interfere 
directly with their ability to make rational decisions.42
Desperation and obsession become key focal points in such dis-
cussions, obscuring the distinctions between these emotions and clin-
ical emotional distress.  In vitro fertilization patients are deemed 
“emotionally weakened” by their failure to conceive a child.
   
43
 
 37. Id. at 1126–28.  See also Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 101 
(1999) (noting that IVF patients experience intense emotions before beginning treatment 
and may have unrealistic expectations of success). 
  For in-
stance, Kansas Gooden remarks that “an infertile couple is often will-
ing to go to any extent to have a child, including signing an informed 
 38. Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need for Consumer-
Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 270 (1997) 
(“Difficulty in conceiving a child is a deeply emotional experience.”); Judith F. Daar, Regu-
lating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 629 (1997) 
(acknowledging that infertility treatment often causes “tremendous emotional and psycho-
logical stress”); Pratt, supra note 36, at 1127–28 (“Long-term treatment of infertility exacts 
a heavy toll, both emotionally and financially.  Infertility often has a devastating emotional 
effect, especially on women.”) (footnotes omitted); Vincent F. Stempel, Procreative Rights in 
Assisted Reproductive Technology: Why the Angst?, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (1999) (“As well 
as being physically and emotionally draining to a woman, the IVF process is often painful 
and intrusive.”) (footnote omitted). 
 39. Byers, supra note 38, at 271; Waldman, supra note 17, at 923; see also Melissa Boat-
man, Comment, Bringing up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable Framework for Resolving 
Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 304 (2008) (noting that de-
pression rates are high for infertile couples undergoing fertility treatment). 
 40. NEGAR NICOLE JACOBS & WILLIAM T. O’DONOHUE, COPING WITH INFERTILITY: 
CLINICALLY PROVEN WAYS OF MANAGING THE EMOTIONAL ROLLER COASTER 70–72 (2007) 
(defining depression as including sadness, inactivity, feelings of worthlessness, feelings of 
guilt, difficulties in relationships, physical symptoms (difficulty sleeping, weight loss/gain, 
difficulty in thinking/concentrating/decisionmaking, sexual dysfunction), and thoughts 
of death). 
 41. Byers, supra note 38, at 271. 
 42. See infra notes 43–47. 
 43. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the 
Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 71. 
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consent agreement.”44  Similarly, Carson Strong states that “despe-
rate” infertile couples “experiencing a great deal of emotional tur-
moil because of their infertility . . . often are willing to do almost any-
thing to have a baby.”45  And Kimberly Krawiec asserts that, “for some 
prospective parents, the desire for a family is so strong that they will 
stop at virtually nothing to procure a child. . . .  [A]ttempts to acquire 
a child often stop only when success is attained or access to funds runs 
out.”46  The consensus is that these myriad vulnerabilities could po-
tentially leave infertility patients open to emotional manipulation and 
exploitation.47
More problematic, however, are assertions that patients’ emo-
tions and the technological complexities of infertility treatments un-
dermine women’s capacity to make informed choices between under-
going infertility treatments and accepting involuntary childlessness.  It 
is often unclear whether scholars perceive that emotions render infer-
tility patients who initiate (and especially persist) with treatment te-
nacious or naïve and gullible.  The Model Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act recommends psychological counseling for infertility 
patients because “the goal of promoting informed decision-making 




 44. Kansas R. Gooden, King Solomon’s Solution to the Disposition of Embryos: Recognizing a 
Property Interest and Using Equitable Division, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 66, 81 (2008). 
  Helene Shapo 
notes infertility’s fundamental emotional nature, opining that “[t]he 
usual premises of bargaining, efficiency, and rationality generally do 
 45. Strong, supra note 16, at 275. 
 46. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY 
AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 41, 44 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 
2010) (highlighting women’s desperation to emphasize that infertile women are incurring 
financial harm because of fee limits for donor eggs, which artificially constrain the egg 
donor market; she argues that lifting these restrictions might ensure greater availability of 
eggs, which may in turn lessen women’s desperation).  
 47. Byers, supra note 38, at 272 (“Considering the societal pressure placed on infertile 
couples, the intense emotions frequently associated with infertility, and the internal desire 
of those affected by infertility to have their own biological children, there is little doubt 
that many infertile couples could be vulnerable and subject to exploitation by third parties 
offering to assist them in their quest for a child.”). 
Nonlegal scholars also have addressed the potential for emotional manipulation.  See 
Sharon Begley with Martha Brant, The Baby Myth, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1995 (describing var-
ious couples’ experiences “in the maw of the infertility machine” as “their own private 
Vietnams: . . . they can’t quit until they have a victory”); Elizabeth Bartholet, In Vitro Fertili-
zation: The Construction of Infertility and of Parenting, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 253, 255 (Helen Bequaert Holmes ed., 1992) (describing a 
1989 fertility clinic advertisement to demonstrate emotional appeals). 
 48. Sara Cotton et al., Model Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 9 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 55, 67 (2005). 
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not hold for people embarking on a program of IVF.”49  Concerned 
about infertile couples’ vulnerability to manipulation, Michele Good-
win asserts that motherhood through ART is an “illusory choice,” ar-
guing that “ART as a technology that affords ‘choice’ can blind 
couples to the less desirable outcomes and unanticipated economic 
and emotional strains associated with this technology.”50  While infer-
tile women look upon ART as “more than a rational choice . . . a 
blessing,”51 others—including some legal scholars—are quick to assert 
that ART is a “collective gamble” that “if taken without caution may 
result in tremendous emotional and physical pain as well as financial 
loss and the health impairment of children.”52  Thus, the choice to 
begin or continue treatment is primarily framed as a somewhat irra-
tional choice made by persons desperate to have a biological child.53
Some scholars focus more intently on the legal implications of 
these “irrational” choices, especially on infertility patients’ diminished 
capacity to give informed consent because their emotions warp or de-
feat rational deliberation.
   
54
 
 49. Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 103 (2002). 
  This perspective not only improperly 
conflates desperation with pathological distress, but it contradicts 
clinical research findings in at least two respects: (1) it fails to distin-
guish distress caused by unsuccessful treatment results from distress 
existing at the time of consent (when the former may be more se-
vere), and (2) it conflates predictable and normal emotions, such as 
the desire to have a child, with more problematic and even pathologi-
cal ones that could interfere with appropriate decision making.   
 50. Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory 
Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 4 (2005). 
 51. Id. at 18. 
 52. Id. at 54. 
 53. A Note in the Harvard Law Review asserts that “[c]onsumers in the market for in-
fertility treatment may be especially vulnerable to emotional manipulation or misinforma-
tion for a variety of reasons,” and that “the highly technical nature” of treatments offers “a 
bewildering array of information that makes it difficult for consumers to make an in-
formed choice.”  Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 2092, 2102 (1996).  In addition, the Note continues, because infertility is “usually an 
emotionally charged subject,” an infertility patient “may . . . continue treatment even when 
it is very unlikely to produce positive results.”  Id. at 2102–03.  See also Note, Assessing the 
Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 
2792, 2811 (2005) (referring to infertile couples as “emotionally vulnerable” and suscepti-
ble to “exploit[ation] by opportunistic IVF providers”). 
 54. See Waldman, supra note 17, at 923–24 (arguing that the emotions experienced by 
women seeking infertility treatment may cause them to ignore anxiety-producing informa-
tion, thus making their consent deficient). 
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Ellen Waldman describes infertility patients as victims of “selec-
tive perception,” who “selectively construct evidence that confirms 
their existing beliefs and desires.”55  Hopeful and anxious, infertility 
patients “have difficulty absorbing medical information and rationally 
evaluating the risks and benefits of various treatment options.”56  
Thus, Waldman claims, informed consent “is seriously hindered by 
the emotional vortex in which reproductive medicine occurs” because 
“[p]atients often resist thoughtfully considering these possibilities 
and must be pressed to seriously evaluate the medical risks that 
[ART] entails.”57
Possession of a high level of technical information, however, 
does not necessarily yield an appreciation of the low likelih-
ood of success promised by these innovations.  The power of 
wishful thinking obscures rational deliberation.  Infertile 
women will often opt for any treatment option presented, 
regardless of the physical, psychological, or financial price.  
This is true even where the chances for success are distinctly 
remote.
  Warnings are drowned out by emotion, leaving in-
fertile women potentially adrift in the wild depths of the in vitro sea:  
58
This alleged incapacity for informed consent also renders prob-
lematic the embryo disposition form that patients must complete in-
structing the fertility clinic how to dispose of embryos after divorce, 
the death of one or both partners, or other situations.
   
59  Some au-
thors voice concern that patients make determinations “on the basis 
of feeling and instinct [rather] than rational deliberation,” and argue 
that inability to predict how one may feel in the future about the im-
portant individual right to decide how one’s reproductive capacity 
will be used undermines contractual capacity.60
 
 55. Id. at 922.   
  Emotions supposedly 
interfere with these decision making processes as well; scholars urge 
readers to consider the “fragile emotional and physical state of the 
patient at the time the agreement is entered into,” and warn that 
“parties rarely can fully appreciate the impact of their decisions when 
 56. Id. at 922–23. 
 57. Id. at 924. 
 58. Id. at 923–24. 
 59. Id. at 925. 
 60. Coleman, supra note 37, at 98–99 (arguing that the right to make decisions about 
embryo disposition should be made inalienable, meaning that one’s decision could be 
changed up until the moment of disposition, to “ensure[] that decisions will be based on a 
greater appreciation of the relevant facts”). 
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the agreements are signed, given the highly emotional circumstances 
of the agreement.”61
In this vein, Waldman asserts that “couples, on what they fervent-
ly hope will be the cusp of parenthood, would be disinclined to con-
template seriously what should be done in the event they lose capacity 
or divorce before having a child.”
   
62  Such problems are compounded, 
she cautions, by combining the embryo disposition form with other 
documents, which “will likely lead to psychological overload, and a 
glossing over the import of the information being conveyed.”63  Simi-
lar concerns motivate Gooden to impose a framework that excludes 
emotions altogether, such as conceptualizing embryo disposition as 
property distribution.64
The specter of desperation haunts constructions of infertile 
women so pervasively that they are unlikely to be seen as assertive and 
educated medical consumers electing ART after a calculated assess-
ment of risks and benefits.  Thus, it is not surprising that scholars as-
sert that “the people who purchase fertility services don’t see them-
selves as participating in a commercial relationship.”
   
65  Here as 
elsewhere, infertile individuals’ desperation is seen to dictate choic-
es.66  As Krawiec notes, “Prospective parents . . . frequently do not en-
gage in extensive price comparison or bargaining over fees; change 
providers only reluctantly, even when faced with a lack of success 
through a given provider; and behave like desperate parents, rather 
than rational consumers, when weighing their purchasing options.”67
Significantly, legal scholars addressing the allegedly grievous 
consequences of infertile women’s desperation sincerely care about 
protecting women’s choices, and likely rely upon such stereotypes to 
demonstrate the need for changes in or restrictions upon ART servic-
es.  Scholars such as Gooden wish to ensure that the choice to under-
   
 
 61. Boatman, supra note 39, at 303, 305. 
 62. Waldman, supra note 17, at 925. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Gooden, supra note 44, at 93 (stating that “courts should recognize a valid 
property interest in embryos” and that under the property perspective “the procreational 
rights of the parties will not control the decision, thereby making the disposition less emo-
tional.”). 
 65. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE 
THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 49 (2006).   
 66. See id. at 48–49 (“The clients’ demand for the ‘product’ is exceedingly strong.  
They are willing to try anything . . . and they are essentially unwilling to give up.”). 
 67. Krawiec, supra note 46, at 45. 
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go fertility treatment is made carefully.68  Krawiec herself has repeat-
edly noted that existing reproductive regulatory schemes propitiate 
gender and class stereotypes and biases and limit women’s effective 
participation in reproductive markets.69  She uses the stereotype of 
the desperate infertile woman to argue that infertile women are 
harmed by fee limits on donor eggs that artificially constrain the egg 
donor market, and contends that lifting these restrictions would en-
sure greater egg availability, lessening infertile women’s despera-
tion.70  Other scholars are concerned that existing regulatory schemes 
and judicial decisions do not place effective limits on ART, a field 
with relatively little oversight.71  From this perspective, infertile wom-
en’s emotions may render them vulnerable to potential exploitation72 
from multiple sources: societal pressures to reproduce, the financial 
incentives for fertility clinics to encourage women to continue with 
low probability or even dangerous treatments, and the commodifica-
tion of women’s reproduction in the context of a market that imposes 
price limits on suppliers but not clinics or patients.  Indeed, these le-
gal scholars are not the first to rely upon the desperation trope; oth-
ers historically relied upon “desperate woman” stereotypes in the 
abortion context to illustrate the dangers of illegal abortions and the 
many societal, regulatory, and institutional roadblocks obstructing the 
path of choice.73
In developing these critiques (some of which have substantial 
merit), scholars construct images of infertile women that may carry 
implications outside of the immediate context.  The common deno-
minator in these depictions is emotional excess, incapacity, or irratio-
nality.  The critiques focus too much on infertile women’s intrinsic 
limitations and less on the source of oppression (or alleged oppres-
sion) that created the writers’ concerns.  Doctors, husbands, and so-
cial pressures to reproduce should occupy center stage in these narra-
tives, but rarely do.  Instead, women’s emotions and frailties take on 
   
 
 68. Cf. Gooden, supra note 27, at 85–86 (arguing that a property interest theory of 
embryo disposition would eliminate the volatility associated with emotion, and thus result 
in more neutral and efficient decisions). 
 69. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1744, 1768 
(2010). 
 70. See generally Krawiec, supra note 46. 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 36–53. 
 72. Courts that face real-world decisions have largely supported women’s capacity to 
make reproductive decisions.  See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) 
(stating that informed consent and disposition agreements should be binding even 
though “we recognize that life is not static, and that human emotions run particularly high 
when a married couple is attempting to overcome infertility problems.”).  
 73. See infra note 145. 
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disproportionate emphasis.  This logic is more woman-destructive 
than woman-protective, undermining decision-making autonomy and 
perpetuating invidious stereotypes.  There are other, more relevant 
justifications for regulatory intervention, including limiting the health 
risks to mothers and fetuses that stem from multiple pregnancies 
created when more embryos than medically necessary are trans-
ferred.74
Moreover, images of desperate pregnant women seeking to ter-
minate unwanted pregnancies are easily distinguished from images of 
desperate infertile women seeking to conceive through IVF.  In the 
abortion context, women’s desperation to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy is rooted in external societal constraints on the abortion 
decision; certain choices are not readily available or are altogether fo-
reclosed.  But in the infertility context, women’s desperation is often 
portrayed as being intrinsic to their emotional state, the result of their 
profound desire to conceive and not the product of societal con-
straints on reproductive decision making.
   
75
B.  Legal Portrayals of Women Considering Abortion 
  The problem is not that 
infertility treatment is not readily available, or altogether foreclosed; 
it is that infertile women’s emotions impair their ability to affirmative-
ly choose to undergo procedures such as IVF.  This intimates that the 
proper regulatory target is infertile women themselves, not other in-
dividuals or institutions.   
A brief glimpse of how pregnant women have been constructed 
as ineffective decision makers in abortion jurisprudence informs our 
understandings of how and why legal scholars have rejected these de-
pictions, offering in their stead representations of savvy and circums-
pect reproductive decision makers.   
1.    The Pregnant Woman and the Abortion Decision in Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence 
Constructions of pregnant women as poor reproductive decision 
makers, unlike those of infertile women, originate in case law.  Liber-
 
 74. See Strong, supra note 16, at 273–74 (noting the significant risks to both mother 
and child involved in multifetal gestation). 
 75. Crucially, scholars, most notably Krawiec, may focus more on how infertile wom-
en’s desperation results from external forces than on whether or not this desperation is 
inherent to their internal emotional states; however, scholars rarely elaborate upon the 
locus of this desperation, and most explicitly assert that it is an emotional consequence of 
women’s infertile status. 
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al feminist76 legal scholars have staunchly opposed these characteriza-
tions.77  Depictions of women considering abortion in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence have morphed from Roe v. Wade’s circumspect rights-
bearer who may obtain an abortion with only minimal physician con-
sultation78 to the more cautious and emotionally vulnerable individu-
al portrayed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey79 and Gonzales v. Carhart.80
Roe defined the risks of denying women the choice to obtain an 
abortion, focusing not on the psychological difficulty of the abortion 
decision but on the mental, physical, and emotional burdens of rais-
ing an unwanted child.
   
81  Roe conceptualized the pregnant woman as 
subject to multiple burdens and harms, acknowledging the social, 
physical, and psychological hardships of childbearing and parent-
hood, and portrayed the difficult abortion decision as a medical one 
to be made by a woman and her physician.82  Subsequent cases ad-
dressed the decision-making process more directly in terms of wheth-
er a woman’s consent to abortion can be “informed” by descriptions 
of pregnancy status; fetal development; dates of possible viability; 
physical and emotional complications from the abortion; risks of car-
rying the child to term; and the availability of agencies assisting with 
birth control, adoption, and childbirth.83  Here, the abortion decision 
is seen as one that must be protected from others’ value judgments,84 
and that primarily lies with the woman.85
Planned Parenthood v. Casey granted states more flexibility to per-
suade pregnant women against abortion, a “unique act . . . fraught 
with consequences for others.”
   
86
 
 76. It is admittedly an oversimplification to divide feminism into “radical” and “liberal” 
camps.  However, an elaborate discussion of the various feminist perspectives—a complex 
topic—is beyond the purposes of this Article.  Radical feminism explicates how patriarchal 
relationships and institutions oppress women and calls for profound social change.     
  The Court defined the constitution-
al question at issue as “whether the State can resolve these philosoph-
ic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in 
 77. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 78. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
 79. 505 U.S. 833, 915–16 (1992). 
 80. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
 81. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764 
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5, 445 
(1983). 
 84. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 776–78 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 781. 
 86. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
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the matter.”87  Emphasizing that the abortion decision should be 
“thoughtful,” “informed,” “deliberate,” and made after a “period of 
reflection,”88 the plurality asserted that the state may “provide a rea-
sonable framework”89 to ensure that women accord this decision its 
due significance,90 and that framework may include providing certain 
information highly relevant to a medical decision to abort.91
The most recent Supreme Court characterization of a woman’s 
decision to obtain an abortion is Gonzales v. Carhart,
  Thus, 
although Casey left a woman’s right to an abortion intact, it granted 
states more power to structure her decision-making process and per-
suade her not to exercise that right.   
92 in which the 
Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal 
regulation prohibiting partial-birth abortion procedures without an 
exception to preserve the mother’s health.93  The Court asserted that 
“[w]hether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral 
decision,” one “fraught with emotional consequence.”94  Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the Court, controversially remarked that “[w]hile we 
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexcep-
tionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to ab-
ort the infant life they once created and sustained.”95
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is 
well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to 
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more an-
guished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only 
after the event, what she once did not know: that she al-
lowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-
developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the 
human form.
  Therefore, he 
concluded:  
96
The rationale undergirding Carhart derives from post-abortion 
syndrome (“PAS”), a condition first proposed in the early 1980s by 
 
 
 87. Id. at 850. 
 88. Id. at 872, 885. 
 89. Id. at 873. 
 90. Id. at 872.   
 91. Id. at 872, 882. 
 92. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 94. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 159–60. 
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psychotherapist and counselor Vincent Rue,97 who claimed that abor-
tion was psychologically distressing and led to feelings of guilt98 and 
other traumatic symptoms.  Until the 1990s, the antiabortion move-
ment relied upon a fetal-protective platform, and PAS was perceived 
by most to detract from the fetal rescue mission.99  But, faced with Bill 
Clinton’s election, the Supreme Court’s preservation of Roe in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, and public ire over clinic violence and abortion 
doctor murders, abortion opponents began to view PAS as an ideal 
argument for reaching audiences concerned with women’s rights and 
welfare.100  It was in the early 1990s that PAS, “a therapeutic discourse 
concerned with informing women’s decision making about abortion, 
[was transformed] into [the] woman-protective antiabortion argu-
ment (WPAA), a political discourse that seeks to persuade voters who 
ambivalently support abortion rights that they can help women by 
imposing legal restrictions on women’s access to abortion.”101
Woman-protective antiabortion argument (“WPAA”) principles 
are evident in both case law and legislative regulations.  Legal scholars 
have suggested that Carhart replaces Casey’s reliance on a “woman’s 
dignity and autonomous choice” rationale with a “women’s regret” 
argument.
   
102  Under Carhart, regulation is necessary to protect a 
woman who is “misled by her physicians, unaware of her own ‘natural’ 
maternal instincts, and ignorant” of abortion’s consequences.103  Not-
ably, the stereotype of the pregnant woman who aborts incorporates 
not only stupidity and irrationality but also unnecessary risk-taking 
and careless decision making.104  Representative Dick Armey stated 
that providing abortion services as part of a national health care 
package would “‘condone the self-indulgent conduct of the body of a 
woman who has already demonstrated’ that she was ‘damned careless 
with it in the first place.’”105
 
 97. Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Rationale, 43 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2008). 
   
 98. Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1658 (2008); Turner, supra note 97, at 
22. 
 99. Siegel, supra note 98, at 1660–62. 
 100. Id. at 1666–69. 
 101. Id. at 1669; cf. Turner, supra note 97, at 21.  
 102. Turner, supra note 97, at 21. 
 103. Rebecca E. Ivey, Note, Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse 
at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1453–54 (2008). 
 104. See David H. Gans, Note, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1902–03 (1995). 
 105. Id. 
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Most recently, the WPAA found fertile ground in South Dakota, 
where a legislative task force report on abortion greatly influenced 
the enactment of the Women’s Health and Human Life Protection 
Act.106  This act, passed in March 2006 as a blatant attempt to over-
turn Roe, was repealed on November 7, 2006, by a citizen referen-
dum.107  The act outlawed most forms of abortion, including for rape 
and incest, but preserved an exception to save the pregnant woman’s 
life.108  The task force report itself concluded that the “unborn child” 
is a full human being from conception, that doctors are obliged to 
treat both pregnant women and their fetuses as patients, that abor-
tion terminates the unique and important fetal-maternal bond, and 
that abortion counseling does not inform women that their children 
already exist.109  The task force majority averred that women can never 
make an informed choice to abort “because a pregnant woman cannot 
make a truly informed decision to give up a relationship with a child 
until after the child is born.”110  Despite the defeat of the Women’s 
Health and Human Life Protection Act, its history demonstrates the 
strength and appeal of WPAAs to contemporary audiences.111
Such arguments may also be found in the work of anti-choice 
scholars, such as David Reardon.  For Reardon, abortion is “over-





 106. H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg. Assemb., 81st Sess. § 1 (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006). 
  He has asserted that “many women fundamentally do 
not want an abortion,” but are pushed into it by social, situational, 
 107. South Dakota Nixes Abortion Ban; Michigan Voters OK Anti-Affirmative Action Initiative, 
FOXNEWS, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,228038,00.html. 
 108. H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg. Assemb., 81st Sess. §§ 1, 2, 4 (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006). 
 109. REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 10, 13–14, 55 
(2005). 
 110. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective 
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1009–10. 
 111. Siegel notes that this argument 
has spread throughout the antiabortion movement.  Several leading antiabor-
tion organizations feature it as a primary argument against the availability of 
abortion.  Other antiabortion organizations feature the harm-to-women argu-
ment as one among many abortion-related concerns.  Several states, including 
Ohio, Mississippi, and Louisiana[,] have followed in South Dakota’s footsteps, 
including the use of the harm-to-women language in legislative findings or tes-
timony. 
Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving 
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 835 n.68 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 112. David C. Reardon, Abortion Decisions and the Duty to Screen: Clinical, Ethical, and Legal 
Implications of Predictive Risk Factors of Post-Abortion Maladjustment, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 33, 65 (2003). 
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and personal pressures, even against “maternal desire.”113  Reardon 
has opined that women considering abortion are unaware that “there 
is no medical evidence that abortion will actually produce the benefits 
they desire,”114 and that concealing information about the fetus or 
pregnancy from them reinforces “a paternalistic view of fragile preg-
nant women who simply cannot handle the full truth about all the 
possible implications of their pregnancy options.”115
2.  Feminist Legal Scholars React to Woman-Protective Rationales 
   
Writing from a very different ideological position, feminist legal 
scholars have vehemently opposed the Supreme Court’s use of wom-
an-protective rationales in abortion jurisprudence.  Their objections 
parallel Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Carhart.  Justice Ginsburg stre-
nuously objected to the majority’s cavalier and intuitive means of de-
ciding that regret is a frequent byproduct of a woman’s decision to 
abort, terming it an “antiabortion shibboleth.”116  While she agreed 
that “for most women, abortion is a painfully difficult decision,” she 
disagreed with the majority’s ruminations on “women’s fragile emo-
tional state” and accused it of “depriv[ing] women of the right to 
make an autonomous choice,” arguing that no evidence suggests that 
“having an abortion is any more dangerous to a woman’s long-term 
mental health than delivering and parenting a child that she did not 
intend to have.”117  It would be more appropriate, she asserted, to 
“require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the 
different procedures and their attendant risks.”118  Justice Ginsburg 
then thoroughly repudiated the majority’s view that the partial-birth 
abortion ban protects women, stating that “[e]liminating or reducing 
women’s reproductive choices is manifestly not a means of protecting 
them.”119
Like Justice Ginsburg, feminist legal scholars object to WPAA as-
sumptions that women are naturally predisposed toward motherhood 
and bonding, that they are unaware of a maternal bond or that they 
can carry their children to term, that women cannot understand 
abortion’s risks and benefits and rationally choose between them, that 
doctors do not want to assist women to make responsible choices, and 
  
 
 113. Id. at 66. 
 114. Id. at 61–62. 
 115. Id. at 55. 
 116. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 127, 183 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 183–84 & n.7. 
 118. Id. at 184. 
 119. Id. at 184 n.9.  
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that a woman choosing abortion is not to blame for resulting emo-
tional or physical harm.120  These scholars fault these assumptions for 
pathologizing women’s decisions to abort as “confused, misled, [] 
coerced,” or abnormal.121  Women who abort are always pathological 
under WPAA tenets; a pregnant woman who feels a maternal bond 
but aborts her pregnancy is traumatized by the procedure, and a 
woman who does not feel a bond and aborts is traumatized by her ab-
errant non-maternal nature.122  Similarly, according to the WPAA, ob-
taining an abortion is inherently unnatural because it is both a non-
maternal and non-procreative act.123
The WPAA as a “one-size-fits-all cure” has also garnered criticism 
as portraying all women as mentally ill, and encompassing all preg-
nant women rather than offering social services to particular groups 
likely to suffer psychological distress.
 
124  Feminist legal scholars argue 
that the needs of some emotionally vulnerable women should not dic-
tate paternalistic reproductive policies for all.125  What is needed is 
not a blanket abortion restriction but rather a method for identifying 
and aiding pregnant women who are actually in mental or emotional 
distress.126
Feminist legal scholars have also extensively criticized portrayals 
of the confused, uninformed, and weak-willed pregnant women inha-
biting Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Elizabeth Reilly argues that 
pregnant women have been portrayed as victims since Roe, at the 
mercy of pregnancy, enforced childbirth, and parenthood, and as pa-
tients who must consult with their physicians before acting.
   
127
 
 120. Ivey, supra note 
  She 
103, at 1491.  
 121. Siegel, supra note 98, at 1687. 
 122. Ivey, supra note 103, at 1499. 
 123. Id. at 1500. 
 124. Siegel, supra note 98, at 1688.  
 125. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 110, at 1033 (“Some individual men and women may 
make decisions in an agitated mental state, and targeted support and safeguards for them 
may be needed, but to regulate on the presupposition that agents are generally in this 
condition is to presume decision makers incapable of acting sui juris, hence requiring pa-
ternalistic oversight.”). 
 126. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Ca-
sey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1796 (2008) (“Blanket restrictions on abortion . . . violate 
the dignity of women who are fully competent to make decisions, and do absolutely noth-
ing to help women who are subject to coercion or mental confusion, or to alter the pres-
sures on women who have decided ending a pregnancy is the best choice under the life 
circumstances and institutional arrangements in which they find themselves.”). 
 127. Elizabeth Reilly, The “Jurisprudence of Doubt”: How the Premises of the Supreme Court’s 
Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 757, 771 (1998).  See also 
Ivey, supra note 103, at 1481–83 (discussing how the Supreme Court has applied WPAA’s 
logic in decisions from Roe to Gonzales). 
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observes that, in case law, pregnant women portrayed as victims are 
better able to obtain access to abortion, but pregnant women por-
trayed as powerful, autonomous agents encounter restricted access to 
abortion.128  According to Reilly, the image of the pregnant woman in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence is but a “caricature” who is “capable of 
the responsibility of motherhood, but not of the full moral responsi-
bility demanded by . . . procreative choices.”129  In a similar vein, Jack 
Balkin notes that the stereotypical portrayal of pregnant women is of 
“victims of emotion; they make bad decisions in a crisis, they are 
prone to panic, and they are easily manipulated by unscrupulous doc-
tors, who apparently have nothing better to do than trick women into 
having abortions that they would not have if they were thinking prop-
erly.”130  Rebecca Dresser, for one, has rejected this “psychological 
vulnerability” as unsupported.131  Scholars contend that women are 
actually astute predictors and mediators of their emotional states, an-
ticipating and indeed overestimating regret, and proffer a more rela-
tional model of autonomy in contending that women make the abor-
tion decision “within a web of interlocking, competing, and often ir-
irreconcilable responsibilities and commitments.”132
Furthermore, feminist legal scholars have commented on both 
the differential treatment of pregnant women compared to women 
needing other medical attention, and the differential treatment of 
   
 
 128. Reilly, supra note 127, at 771–72.   
 129. Id. at 790–91. 
 130. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 527 (2007). 
 131. Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion 
Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1616–20 (2008) (discussing informed consent and how 
it has evolved from a “freedom of choice” doctrine to a doctrine that is intended to moti-
vate women to choose what the legislature views as “morally appropriate” by seeking to 
highlight that women who receive abortions may suffer from psychological feelings of re-
gret as a consequence of their choice if it is not fully informed). 
 132. Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 82–83, 85 
(1990).  See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 425, 447 (2006) (“If one believes that the decisions of individual women typically 
are informed, deliberate, and not influenced by social pressures to have abortions, then 
the ‘informed consent’ restrictions upheld in Casey appear as nothing more than gratuit-
ous interference with the right to choose abortion.”); Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Gov-
ernment Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1916, 1936 (1988) (arguing that marginalizing women’s autonomy to choose has negative 
implications for gender equality rights and serves to limit women within the legal system as 
autonomous individuals); Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of 
Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 882, 886, 902 (2008); Ivey, supra note 103, at 1453–54; Kathe-
rine C. Sheehan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Doubt, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 201, 223 (1997) 
(contending that women are subject to undue burdens imposed by society and the courts 
that affect their ability to make free and individually motivated choices).  
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pregnant women seeking to abort compared to those seeking to carry 
to term.  They note that women considering abortion do not receive 
the respect accorded other patients, as shown through the abortion 
counseling and waiting period requirements.133  They protest that 
women, whether pregnant or not, are considered capable of making 
other medical decisions in other contexts that are not burdened with 
ideological and moral baggage.134  Moreover, they assert, pregnant 
women who do not seek abortion are not exposed to informed con-
sent materials and required to wait a statutorily specified time period 
before electing to continue their pregnancies.135
Another frequent scholarly criticism of the WPAA is paternalism.  
Legal scholars have repeatedly emphasized that WPAA principles de-
grade women and their powers of physical and moral reasoning.  The 
WPAA embodies the chauvinistic idea that women are the property of 
men and that others are entitled to use women’s bodies as means to 
social or moral ends.
   
136  Paternalism also results from viewing female 
reproductive capacity as “of concern to others” besides the woman 
herself.137  The WPAA legitimates “anxiety” over female reproduction 
and female agency, enabling legal regulation.138  Such paternalistic 
assumptions offend women’s bodily integrity, damage women’s iden-
tity and self-esteem,139 and reduce women to their wombs.140
 
 133. Charlene Carres, Legislative Efforts to Limit State Reproductive Privacy Rights, 25 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 273, 283 (1998); Gans, supra note 
  Affirm-
104, at 1903. 
 134. Gans, supra note 104, at 1903. 
 135. Id. (“If a woman comes to an abortion clinic and tells the clinic staff that she wants 
to carry her child to term, the state does not force the woman to return home and rethink 
her decision.”). 
 136. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 268 (1986); see also 
Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 489 (1995) (commenting 
on gender equality and liberty with respect to issues of reproductive law and arguing that 
courts have limited women’s autonomy as decisionmakers by affirming states’ imposition 
of paternalistic restrictions on their right to choose abortion); Bagenstos, supra note 132, 
at 456 (arguing that the “‘informed consent’ requirements in Casey reflect a gender-based 
paternalism towards women”); Heather A. Smith, Comment, A New Prescription for Abortion, 
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2002) (pointing to the “mandatory twenty-four hour wait-
ing periods” imposed on women who are seeking abortion as a paternalistically imposed 
limit on women’s right to choose).   
 137. Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting 
Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 147, 183 (1996). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration of 
Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 371–72, 382–83 (1995) (“By interfering in unique ways with 
women’s bodily integrity in the guise of regulation of procreative decisionmaking, law 
both facilitates and justifies that violation of bodily integrity.  Because bodily integrity is 
necessary for the formation of selfhood, it is essential that law recognize women’s subjec-
tivity in its construction of women’s procreative lives.”). 
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ing a pregnant woman’s decision-making capacity is to oppose pater-
nalism,141 and to affirm feminine autonomy and control, and there-
fore feminine dignity.142
C.  Why Do These Tensions Exist? 
   
Legal scholars’ constructions of infertile women undergoing IVF 
are in strong tension with constructions of women considering abor-
tion, despite the fact that in both contexts women are making repro-
ductive decisions.143
The differences between the constructions of women seeking fer-
tility treatment and women considering abortion do not merely indi-
cate two conflicting portraits in awkward coexistence.  While contem-
porary abortion scholarship portrays women as competent decision 
makers,
  Effectively countering protectionist arguments 
requires first considering why scholars continue to make use of the 
desperate female reproductive decision maker stereotype for infertile 
women but reject it for pregnant women considering abortion. 
144 historically scholars writing on abortion emphasized wom-
en’s vulnerability and desperation.  Scholars used the dramatic por-
trait of the desperate pregnant woman to highlight the dangers of 
back-alley abortions, unsanitary conditions, and unscrupulous and un-
licensed providers.145
 
 140. Id. at 417. 
  After abortion was legalized, scholars’ abortion 
 141. Id. (“The meaning that women ascribe to their abortions, to their mothering deci-
sions, and to intrauterine life is crucial to this legal process.  Any legal construction that 
keeps women from making these decisions will reaffirm procreativity as the object of male 
domination.”). 
 142. Siegel, supra note 111, at 818–19. 
 143. Compare Daar, supra note 36, at 629 (emphasizing the role of stress, both emotional 
and psychological, in the decision making of women seeking fertility treatment), and 
Waldman, supra note 17, at 923 (explaining that infertile women’s ability to make rational 
decisions is undermined by the “power of wishful thinking”), with Guthrie, supra note 132, 
at 882 (suggesting that women contemplating abortion are able to harness the experience 
of regret into informed decision making). 
 144. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 132, at 893 (suggesting that most women who decide 
to obtain an abortion “will experience comparably high levels of well-being and compara-
bly low levels of regret”). 
 145. See Brief for Amici Curiae Women Who Have Had Abortions and Friends of Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) 
(No. 88-605) (including descriptions of women’s experiences with illegal abortions, in 
which they characterize themselves as desperate and vulnerable); Richard Delgado & Ju-
dith Droz Keyes, Parental Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commentary on Roe v. Wade, 
Doe v. Bolton, and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 203, 224 n.115 (stating 
that “restrictive abortion laws drove ‘large numbers of desperate women into the hands of 
the very person from whom the law seeks to shield them’”); Andrea Dworkin, “Abortion,” 
Chapter 3, Right-Wing Women, 1 LAW & INEQ. 95, 95 (1983) (describing “doctors who were 
asked for ‘help’ by desperate women”); Margie Ripper, Abortion: The Shift in Stigmatisation 
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arguments changed, focusing on what obstacles a state could legiti-
mately place in women’s paths.146  Scholars’ portrayals of the preg-
nant woman have accordingly evolved from a desperate woman into 
one who is a circumspect and competent reproductive decision mak-
er.147
But in the ART context, women seeking fertility treatment do not 
face the same obstacles they must overcome in obtaining abortions.  
Scholars might actually be using the desperate woman stereotype to 
demonstrate the need for restrictions on ART services and effect legal 
change,
   
148 not to create unflattering stereotypes.  For instance, despe-
ration might provide a woman with an argument as to why she should 
be able to avoid ART documents that are allegedly contracts of adhe-
sion.149




from Those Seeking Abortion to Those Providing It, 10 HEALTH SOC. REV. 65, 66 (2001) (noting 
that “in the public debates surrounding the reforms, the stereotypic ‘backyard abortionist’ 
was commonly invoked as being not medically trained, uncaring, unclean, unscrupulous, 
and ‘taking advantage’ of desperate women”); Ruth Roemer, Editorial, The Right to Choose 
Abortion, 64 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 751, 751 (1974) (characterizing the pre-Roe period as a 
time when “dangerous, illegal abortion was the sole solution for desperate women faced 
with unwanted pregnancies”); Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 BYU L. REV. 
231, 240 (referring to “invidious laws that were forcing desperate women to seek the radi-
cal remedy of abortion”).  Images of desperate women seeking abortions still populate 
areas of abortion scholarship where greater abortion access is sought for certain groups, 
such as minors.  See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Good Casuistry and Bad Casuistry: Resolving the 
Dilemmas Faced by Catholic Judges, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 269, 277 (2006) (stating that “[a] 
desperate minor may even feel compelled to seek an underground abortion”).    
 have not 
yet addressed this issue is not willful ignorance but the altogether un-
 146. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 131, at 1616 (critiquing laws requiring women’s in-
formed consent before obtaining an abortion). 
 147. See supra notes 126–132 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Roemer, supra note 145, at 821–22 (highlighting the need for change by 
emphasizing the difficulties that “desperate women” encounter when trying to obtain an 
abortion); Wardle, supra note 145, at 240 (explaining the effects of “invidious laws” on 
young and frantic women seeking an abortion). 
 149. See Coleman, supra note 37, at 104 (stating that “the contractual approach turns 
the couple’s most personal decisions about how their reproductive capacity will be used 
into a nonnegotiable clause in a contract of adhesion”); Sara D. Petersen, Dealing With 
Cryopreserved Embryos upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expecta-
tions, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065, 1089 (2003) (discussing scholars who view written consent 
forms provided by infertility clinics as adhesion contracts); John A. Robertson, In the Be-
ginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 465 (1990) (explaining that 
“IVF programs and embryo banks may have such monopoly power that the conditions they 
offer give couples little real choice, making them the equivalent of adhesion contracts”).   
 150. Early radical feminists, alarmed by the potential consequences of ART, have tradi-
tionally opposed ART services.  See, e.g., Renate Klein, From Test-Tube Women to Bodies With-
out Women, 31 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 157, 157–58 (2008) (describing the development of 
organizations aimed at stopping the “dehumanising” reproductive technologies); Marga-
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derstandable rationale that constructions of infertile women have his-
torically posed a lesser threat than constructions of women consider-
ing abortion.  Addressing scholarly images of infertile women has tak-
en place on the level of narrative construction, not on that of legal 
doctrine.  Unlike the abortion decision, a matter long ago thrust into 
the heart of constitutional jurisprudence and privacy discourse, ART 
and stereotypes of infertile women have not been the basis of legal 
regulation.  The abortion debate arguably came to a head in the 
1980s, when states enacted legislation limiting women’s abortion 
access and decision making.151  Only recently have threats to repro-
ductive autonomy arisen in the infertility context.152
A host of other reasons may underlie scholars’ odd adherence to 
protectionism.  Legal scholars may be uncomfortable making repro-
   
 
rete Sandelowski, Fault Lines: Infertility and Imperiled Sisterhood, 16 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 34 
(1990) (arguing that fertility treatments are involved in the alienation of women from 
their bodies and their children); Christine St. Peter, Feminist Discourse, Infertility, and Repro-
ductive Technologies, 1 NWSA J. 353, 355 (1989) (asserting that women will “buy the defini-
tion of infertility as disease, then buy the need for medically intrusive, expensive, and even 
dangerous ‘cures’”).  They asserted that infertile women sought to conceive to satisfy prob-
lematic psychological or psychiatric needs.  See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE 
LEGACY OF BABY M 124 (1988) (arguing that a child has become “a ‘life-style’ commodity 
to be acquired”); Jalna Hanmer, A Womb of One’s Own, in TEST TUBE WOMEN: WHAT 
FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 438, 445 (Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein & Shelley Minden 
eds., 1984) (“Women frequently believe they must have children to be ‘real’ and ‘full’ 
women because they are not valued as autonomous human beings but only as servicers to 
men, primarily as wives and mothers.”); Sultana Kamal, Seizure of Reproductive Rights? A Dis-
cussion on Population Control in the Third World and the Emergence of the New Reproductive Tech-
nologies in the West, in MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC 
PROGRESS 146, 153 (Patricia Spallone & Deborah Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987) (suggesting 
that the “craving to have a child” stems from a desire to have someone to control).  These 
early radical feminists intimated that infertile women, blinded by science, were not only 
ignorant of physiological side effects and political and social implications, but could not 
help themselves by declining further treatment.  See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 6 
(1979) (stating that the “fact has not surfaced” that women suffer from IVF programs due 
to selective publicity that focuses only on successful treatments); Barbara Katz Rothman, 
The Meanings of Choice in Reproductive Technology, in TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra, at 23, 31–32 
(explaining that the abundance of new infertility treatments do not enhance women’s 
choices, but rather create a burden for infertile women who feel the need to try everything 
before finally giving up fertility treatments).  This perspective painted infertile women’s 
consent to ART as the inauthentic product of coercion, and thus of no real value.  See 
COREA, supra, at 166.  Although legal scholars locate infertile women’s incapacity in emo-
tion while radical feminists point to patriarchy, both arguments have the same policy im-
plication: that infertile women should be prevented from making treatment choices that 
they are ill-equipped to make in their vulnerable state.  See id. 
 151. See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 3203–3220 (1990), upheld in part and invalidated in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 3–8. 
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duction a commodity.153  Certainly there are people who make money 
in the ART business.  Similarly, there may be less motivation to come 
to the aid of wealthy, educated women than to assist women who seek 
abortions, particularly when stereotypes portray infertility as the 
“yuppie woman’s disease” and infertile women as rich, spoiled, and 
voluntarily delaying childbirth in favor of career or education.154  It 
may be that infertile women are perceived to have viable alternatives 
to childbearing such as adoption.155
One final explanation might be that some legal scholars view 
such protectionist measures as necessary to promote a feminist agen-
da of autonomy.  In a sense, abortion is a much easier case for femin-
ists: Women who obtain abortions are defying patriarchal establish-
ments, while women undergoing infertility treatment seem to be 
complying with them.  Whereas women have not been socially condi-
tioned to have abortions, they have been conditioned to desire physi-
cal motherhood.
  Notwithstanding all of these jus-
tifications, protectionist constructions of infertile women are inaccu-
rate and unnecessary evils.  Such demeaning constructions scar the 
discursive topography of meta-narrative concerning women and child-
rearing, rendering its landscape ugly.   
156  Therefore, women seeking to conceive are ostens-
ibly in need of more protection against the dominant culture.157
III.  COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS: WHY CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFERTILE 
WOMEN AND THEIR TREATMENT DECISIONS ARE INACCURATE 
   
Legal scholars’ constructions of infertile women not only contra-
dict other, more pervasive and empowering constructions of women 
 
 153. See, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procrea-
tion: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 257, 272 (2002) (critiquing the buying and selling of genetic material). 
 154. Elizabeth Stern, the intended mother in the infamous surrogacy case, In Re Baby M, 
was described as a career woman, and not as a mother.  CHESLER, supra note 150, at 23; see 
also MARDY S. IRELAND, RECONCEIVING WOMEN: SEPARATING MOTHERHOOD FROM FEMALE 
IDENTITY 8 (1993) (describing the stereotype of “a socially isolated, career-driven woman 
consumed by a fatal jealousy and envy of motherhood and the nuclear family”).  
 155. This rationale is frequently advanced by courts awarding frozen pre-embryos to the 
party who does not want to become a genetic parent in divorce disputes.  See, e.g., Kass v. 
Kass, 235 N.Y.S.2d 581, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (stating that a woman’s preference for 
genetic parenthood should not override her former partner’s desire not to be a parent, 
unless she can show that no other means exist for her to become a parent), aff’d, 696 
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (explaining that 
a woman’s desire to become a parent may outweigh her former partner’s wish not to be-
come a parent if there are no other means for the woman to attain parenthood). 
 156. See St. Peter, supra note 150, at 355 (stating that women are “often conditioned to 
think of child-rearing as life’s primary focus”). 
 157. See supra note 150. 
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considering abortion, they also conflict with clinical psychological and 
psychiatric research addressing the link between infertility and emo-
tional distress;158 with normative arguments that ART expands wom-
en’s reproductive choices and that women can freely choose to have 
children;159 and with empirical research on the constructive roles that 
emotion can play in medical and reproductive decision making.160
A.  The Teachings of Clinical Research 
  To 
these ends, this Part will describe why desperation must be decoupled 
from irrationality, explain why irrationality might not be the best 
framework for assessing the quality of infertile women’s treatment de-
cisions, detail emotion’s valuable role in decision making, and dem-
onstrate the need to recognize the socially embedded nature of infer-
tile women as reproductive decision makers and of their treatment 
decisions. 
The coupling of irrationality and infertile women’s alleged incli-
nation towards emotional extremes originates in both centuries-old 
scientific and medical theories of hysteria and repronormativity.161  
For hundreds of years, female emotional excesses have been seen as 
manifestations of hysteria.  The ancients believed that “disordered 
sexuality” was related to emotional instability, and proposed that the 
womb was a restless and dissatisfied organ162 that sometimes wandered 
off, causing physiological mayhem.163
 
 158. See infra text accompanying notes 
  The prescribed remedy was to 
marry the suffering woman off so that the uterus could become 
177–180. 
 159. See Diane C. Parry, Women’s Experiences with Infertility: Exploring the Outcome of Empo-
werment, 34 WOMEN’S STUD. 191, 195 (2005) (describing the position that reproductive 
technologies support women’s “right to reproduce as they see fit”). 
 160. See supra note 13. 
 161. This stereotype is not new; the idea that “women are naturally maternal, but not 
naturally rational” can be linked to Victorian ideology and historical images of hysterical 
women. See Siegel, supra note 110, at 1032–33 (comparing the portrait of a pregnant wom-
an in emotional crisis considering abortion with the hysterical woman of the nineteenth 
century); Ivey, supra note 103, at 1496.  Other scholars have documented the effects of fe-
minism on law.  See Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Dis-
course, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (2010) (examining how feminist critique has in-
formed legal doctrine dealing with women’s potentially harmful choices). 
 162. See ELISABETH BRONFEN, THE KNOTTED SUBJECT: HYSTERIA AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
105 (1998) (describing how Hippocrates connected hysteria with “a restless, dissatisfied 
womb”); PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, PERSPECTIVES ON “HYSTERIA” 14–15 (1990) (elaborating on 
how ancient scholars linked hysteria with sexual dysfunction); Gabrielle Murphy, Hysteria’s 
Story: History or Legend?, 353 THE LANCET 1806, 1806 (1999) (explaining that the associa-
tion between hysteria and the female reproductive system has long been recognized).   
 163. MARK S. MICALE, APPROACHING HYSTERIA: DISEASE AND ITS INTERPRETATION 19 
(1995); PLATO, TIMAEUS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Project Gutenberg 2008) (360 B.C.E.).   
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grounded with a child.164  By the seventeenth century, physicians no 
longer believed in the uterus with wanderlust, but theorized that ute-
rine vapors interacted with other organs.165  By the eighteenth cen-
tury, the focus was on the brain itself, and hysteria became a disorder 
of the nervous system.166  In the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud 
proposed that hysteria was rooted in histories of trauma.167  Hybrid 
neurouterine theories continued to emerge into the twentieth cen-
tury.168  Whatever its origins, the dimensions of hysteric behavior have 
remained the same: “highly negative character traits, including eccen-
tricity, impulsiveness, emotionality, coquettishness, deceitfulness, and 
hypersexuality.”169  Nervous hysterical disorders, allegedly caused by 
over-education and a luxurious lifestyle, were blamed for genteel in-
fertility in wealthy classes.170  As it gained recognition as a nervous 
disorder, hysteria became affiliated with a certain type of woman—an 
idle, delicate, and melancholic genteel white woman.171
With the advent of new opportunities for women, hysteria ac-
quired hegemonic socio-cultural dimensions and proved useful for 
ostracizing “unnatural” women who sought education, equality, and 
employment outside of the home.  From the “shriveling ovaries of 
educated women” to Harvard President Edward Clarke’s 1873 remark 
opposing women’s education because the “blood demanded by the 
brain would prevent the reproductive system from developing proper-
ly,”
   
172 opposition to increased public roles for women was legitimized 
through medical research,173
 
 164. DONALD CAPPS, JESUS THE VILLAGE PSYCHIATRIST 110 (2008); Murphy, supra note 
 and hysteria became a warning about 
162, at 1806. 
 165. BRONFEN, supra note 162, at 108. 
 166. Id. at 111. 
 167. Murphy, supra note 162, at 1806. 
 168. CAPPS, supra note 164, at 110. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Laura Briggs, The Race of Hysteria: “Overcivilization” and the “Savage” Woman in 
Late Nineteenth-Century Obstetrics and Gynecology, 52 AM. Q. 246, 254–55 (2000). 
 171. BRONFEN, supra note 162, at 111.  The hysterical ideal was a “delicate and highly 
sensitive woman who suffers convulsions at the vivid description of a tragic event or faints 
at the slightest onset of pain.”  Id. at 113.  After conducting a reading of late-nineteenth 
century American Journal of Obstetrics articles, Laura Briggs concluded that “its physician-
contributors understood and deployed [gendered] distinctions extensively, characterizing 
white women as weak, frail, and nervous . . . .”  Briggs, supra note 170, at 247.  Hysterical 
women were considered subconsciously self-absorbed and therefore frail.  BRONFEN, supra 
note 162, at 114. 
 172. Briggs, supra note 170, at 248, 250. 
 173. As Laura Briggs asserted, “[l]ate nineteenth-century gynecological and obstetrical 
literature . . . naturalize[d] opposition to white women’s political struggles by insisting that 
contraceptive use, abortion, education, and participation in the professional workforce 
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the dangerous consequences for women of engaging in “unfeminine” 
behavior.174
Contemporary clinical literature, being positive rather than 
normative, has very different characterizations of infertile women.  
Research diverges on whether there is a consistent link between infer-
tility and emotional disorders such as clinical depression.
   
175  To the 
extent that the clinical literature correlates infertility with anxiety, 
stress, emotion, and determination, even depression or desperation, it 
does not necessarily show a deterioration in judgment, an inability to 
weigh choices appropriately, or a lack of decision-making capacity 
that would vitiate informed consent.176
Clinical research substantiates legal scholars’ observations that 
infertile women are determined to conceive.  Clinicians observe that 
infertility “becomes the focal point of daily discourse and tasks”
   
177 for 
infertile women, even becoming their sole focus,178 and note that 
women are willing to try any viable treatment,179 even those with a po-
tential increased risk of ovarian cancer.180
Legal scholars frequently describe infertile women as irrational 
for electing to undergo a procedure with such low odds of success.
  They do not conclude, 
however, that for infertile women a perceived loss of control stemming 
from infertility is equivalent to an actual loss of self-control. 
181
 
could cause nervous illness.”  Id. at 250.  Such “unnatural” women were even thought by 
some to be racial traitors who endangered the white race through their low fertility.  Id. at 
246–47. 
  
Clinical statistics, however, show that the chances of successfully con-
ceiving are much higher than legal scholars claim, making the choice 
to pursue ART more reasonable.  In 2007, women 35 and younger en-
joyed a 45.7 percent likelihood of becoming pregnant through IVF 
 174. Id. at 248.  See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, COMPLAINTS AND 
DISORDERS: THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF SICKNESS 40 (1973) (stating that “[t]he hysterical 
‘type’ [was] . . . characterized as a ‘petty tyrant’ with a ‘taste for power’ over her husband, 
servants, and children . . . .”); BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN 
GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS’ ADVICE TO WOMEN (1978). 
 175. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 176. See infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text. 
 177. Tara M. Cousineau & Alice D. Domar, Psychological Impact of Infertility, 21 BEST 
PRAC. & RES. CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 293, 295 (2007).   
 178. Id. at 296. 
 179. Judith Daniluk, Helping Patients Cope with Infertility, 40 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 661, 665 (1997).   
 180. Brenda S. Houmard & David B. Seifer, Infertility Treatment and Informed Consent: 
Current Practices of Reproductive Endocrinologists, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 252, 256 
(1999). 
 181. See Waldman, supra note 17, at 923–24 (explaining that women will undergo fertili-
ty treatment, even though “the chances for success are distinctly remote”).   
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without donor eggs, as did 37.2 percent of women 35 to 37; although 
pregnancy rates for older women were lower (28.1 percent for women 
38 to 40, and 18.4 percent for women 41 to 42), 55.1 percent of IVF 
cycles using fresh donor eggs resulted in a live birth for all ages com-
bined.182
Clinical research also undermines legal scholars’ contentions 
that infertile women are not circumspect and strategic ART consum-
ers.  Infertile women strive to play an active role in reproductive deci-
sion making and report conducting extensive research on infertility 
and treatment choices.
   
183  After conducting open-ended interviews 
with infertile couples undergoing IVF, Margarete Sandelowski and 
her co-authors note that, after deciding to seek medical treatment, in-
fertile couples “engaged in as rational an accounting process as they 
could and weighed the options known and accessible to them” before 
evolving a strategic “calculus of pursuit . . . of resources, of venture 
capital including time, money, and physical and psychic energy and 
then . . . determined whether to pursue it at a given time.”184
Clinical research does acknowledge that infertility is emotionally 
distressing.  Identified psychological responses to infertility include 
surprise, denial, anxiety, anger, guilt, poor self-image or decreased 
self-esteem, isolation, distrust of one’s body, loss of bodily integrity 
and privacy, overgeneralization of loss of control over reproduction to 
other aspects of life, hopelessness, feelings of unfulfillment, inability 
to plan for the future, compromised ability to find alternate goals and 




 182. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2007 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES (2009), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2007/PDF/COMPLETE_2007_ART.pdf. 
  Many research-
 183. See Parry, supra note 159, at 202 (relating women’s experiences of researching fer-
tility treatments); see also Margarete Sandelowski, Betty G. Harris & Diane Holditch-Davis, 
Mazing: Infertile Couples and the Quest for a Child, 21 J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 220–26 
(1989). 
 184. Sandelowski et al., supra note 183, at 223. 
 185. See SUSAN LEWIS COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, CHOOSING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 17–18 (1998) (explain-
ing the sense of loss and distress that accompanies infertility); BETH COOPER-HILBERT, 
INFERTILITY AND INVOLUNTARY CHILDLESSNESS: HELPING COUPLES COPE 32, 39–46 (1998) 
(describing a range of effects of infertility on a couple); JACOBS & O’DONOHUE, supra note 
40, at 69 (discussing the “emotional roller coasting” of infertility); S.R. Leiblum, A. Aviv & 
R. Hamer, Life After Infertility Treatment: A Long-Term Investigation of Marital and Sexual Func-
tion, 13 HUM. REPROD. 3569, 3569 (1998) (stating that women can experience considera-
ble disappointment when fertility treatments are unsuccessful); N.N. Mahajan et al., Ad-
justment to Infertility: The Role of Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Resources/Vulnerabilities, 24 
HUM. REPROD. 906, 906 (2009) (stating that women often experience infertility with feel-
ings of hopelessness and loss of control); Lone Schmidt, Comment, Psychosocial Burden of 
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ers have found that most infertility patients, particularly women, find 
infertility and its treatment to be “the most upsetting experience of 
their lives.”186  An infertility diagnosis is often described as an intangi-
ble loss that triggers cyclical grieving like that from a loved one’s 
death.187  It involves multiple losses: pregnancy, childbirth, and 
breastfeeding; a sense of genetic continuity, experiences of parent-
hood and relationships, and a key element of adult and gender iden-
tity.188  Infertility treatments also introduce new moral and ethical di-
lemmas if surrogates and donors are used.189
Clinicians have a more nuanced understanding of infertility’s 
unique emotional impact upon women.  Its effects are more pro-
nounced on women than on men; women are more likely to expe-
rience lower self-esteem and life satisfaction and increased self-blame 
and greater psychological distress, and find it harder to leave behind 
the biological parenthood ideal.
  
190  Women must carry the burden of 
an infertility diagnosis whether they themselves are infertile or infer-
tile by association; they undergo the most monitoring, invasive treat-
ments, pain, medication side effects, and schedule disruptions.191
 
Infertility and Assisted Reproduction, 367 THE LANCET 379, 379 (2006) (describing women in 
infertile relationships as having decreased self-esteem and lowered life satisfaction).  
  Re-
search also suggests that infertile women experience infertility as a 
chronic disease, experiencing levels of depression and anxiety indis-
 186. Cousineau & Domar, supra note 177, at 295. 
 187. See DEBRA BRIDWELL, THE ACHE FOR A CHILD 94–95 (1994); The Psychological Impact 
of Infertility and Its Treatment, 25 HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER (Harv. Med. Sch.), May 
2009, at 1–2 (“Individuals who learn they are infertile often experience the normal but 
nevertheless distressing emotions common to those who are grieving any significant 
loss . . . .”). 
 188. See Reneé M. Dunnington & Greer Glazer, Maternal Identity and Early Mothering Be-
havior in Previously Infertile and Never Infertile Women, 20 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC & 
NEONATAL NURSING 309, 309 (1991) (explaining that infertile women experience a loss of 
maternal identity); Barbara Eck Menning, The Psychosocial Impact of Infertility, 17 NURSING 
CLINICS N. AM. 159 (1982) (explaining that women’s self-images must be disconnected 
from child-bearing when they discover they are unable to have children); Robert D. Nach-
tigall et al., The Effects of Gender-Specific Diagnosis on Men’s and Women’s Response to Infertility, 
57 FERTILITY & STERILITY 113, 113 (1992) (stating that infertility causes higher levels of 
stress in women than in men); Ellen Frances Olshansky, Identity of Self as Infertile: An Exam-
ple of Theory-Generating Research, 9 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI. 57–58 (1987) (describing how 
infertile women develop an identity focused on their infertility). 
 189. Cousineau & Domar, supra note 177, at 298.   
 190. Id. (stating that infertility can challenge the “core female identity” leading to dimi-
nished self-worth); see also COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 185, at 17–19 (finding that the 
female member of the infertile couple tends to exhibit higher levels of depression than 
the male); Judith C. Daniluk, Infertility: Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Impact, 49 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 982, 988 (1988) (same); Schmidt, supra note 185, at 379 (same). 
 191. Cousineau & Domar, supra note 177, at 296 (stating that women are the “identified 
patient” who undergoes invasive procedures, monitoring, and scheduling disruption).   
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tinguishable from those of women with cancer, hypertension, myo-
cardial infarction, or HIV.192  The treatment of infertility is, after all, 
like that of a chronic illness, entailing extensive medical appoint-
ments, testing, medication, surgical intervention, pain, drug side ef-
fects, fear, grief, and psychological identity adjustment.193
A number of important caveats bear upon the link between infer-
tility and depression.  Although there is disagreement as to whether 
infertility is correlated with clinically significant or pathological levels 
of distress, clinical researchers do agree that emotional distress is 
most likely to occur subsequent to a treatment cycle
   
194—after informed 
consent and embryo disposition forms are signed, and particularly af-
ter multiple failed treatment cycles.195  Women may also “suppress or 
downplay their stress during treatment” to cope with the emotional 
strain of awaiting treatment outcomes,196 perhaps providing further 
additional evidence that the onslaught of distress occurs later, not 
earlier, in the cycle, diminishing its effect on informed consent.  Clin-
ical researchers have also found that severely distressed women are 
more likely to discontinue treatment rather than persistently undergo 
cycle after cycle.197
 
 192. See A. D. Domar, P. C. Zuttermeister & R. Friedman, The Psychological Impact of Infer-
tility: A Comparison with Patients with Other Medical Conditions, 14 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC 
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 45, 49 (1993) (suggesting that “the psychological distress 
which is associated with infertility can be as profound as with life-threatening illnesses such 
as cancer and heart disease”). 
  In addition, the infertility diagnosis itself impacts 
the likelihood that a woman will become depressed; women under-
going IVF because their male partners are infertile and who acknowl-
 193. BRIDWELL, supra note 187, at 94–95, 129, 146.     
 194. See, e.g., Catherine H. Garner, Edward W. Arnold & Holly Gray, The Psychological 
Impact of In-Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 13S (1984) (providing data that 
show couples exhibit increased behavioral responses, including anger, sadness, depres-
sion, and loss of self-worth, following an unsuccessful in vitro fertilization attempt). 
 195. A. D. Domar et al., Psychological Improvement in Infertile Women After Behavioral Treat-
ment: A Replication, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 144, 146 (1992) (noting that “recent research 
has demonstrated that symptoms of depression, hostility, and anxiety increase as duration 
of infertility treatment increases.”). 
 196. Koen Demyttenaere et al., Coping Style and Depression Level Influence Outcome in In 
Vitro Fertilization, 69 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1026, 1027 (1998).  See also Jacky Boivin & Janet 
E. Takefman, Stress Level Across Stages of In Vitro Fertilization in Subsequently Pregnant and Non-
pregnant Women, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 802, 808 (1995) (finding that women reported 
lower levels of stress while awaiting the results of treatment, but recalled the waiting pe-
riod as one of the most stressful stages after becoming aware of the results of treatment). 
 197. Demyttenaere et al., supra note 196, at 1026 (“Some studies have demonstrated 
that higher trait anxiety levels or higher depression levels . . . increase the likelihood that a 
woman will abandon further IVF attempts.”). 
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edge negative emotions are less likely to be depressed than women 
who are diagnosed as infertile.198
Finally, clinical researchers emphasize clinical depression, not 
the frantic and endless pursuit of pregnancy that terms such as “des-
peration” and “obsession” imply.  While studies substantiate a link be-
tween infertility and distress, they do not correlate distress to incapac-
ity, or equate desperation to clinical depression.  Research differs as 
to how strongly depression is tied to infertility, with some studies sup-
porting a link
   
199 and others concluding that no correlation exists.200
 
 198. Id. at 1033. 
 
 199. Numerous studies suggest that anxiety and depression are the most common reac-
tions to infertility treatment, or conclude that infertile women have significantly higher 
levels of depressive symptoms than in the general population and even two or three times 
more than fertile women.  See, e.g., Ting-Hsiu Chen et al., Prevalence of Depressive and Anxiety 
Disorders in an Assisted Reproductive Technique Clinic, 19 HUM. REPROD. 2313, 2317 (2004) 
(finding infertile women who were preparing for a new course of ART had higher depres-
sive symptoms than women in the general population); J. Cwikel et al., Psychological Interac-
tions with Infertility Among Women, 117 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. 
BIOLOGY 126, 128 (2004) (collecting studies that support a connection between infertility 
and depression); Alice D. Domar et al., The Prevalence and Predictability of Depression in Infer-
tile Women, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1158, 1160–61 (1992) (finding that 37 percent of in-
fertile women scored in the “depressed” range on the Beck Depression Inventory as com-
pared to 18 percent of control subjects, with 8.4 percent of infertile women experiencing 
symptoms in the severe to extremely severe range); Domar et al., supra note 195, at 147 
(concluding that behavioral treatment is associated with improvements in the psychologi-
cal symptoms often experienced by infertile women); Jennifer Downey & Mary McKinney, 
The Psychiatric Status of Females Presenting for Infertility Evaluation, 62 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 196, 203 (1992) (finding that 11 percent of infertile women satisfied 
criteria for a major depressive episode, as compared with 3.6 percent of control subjects); 
A. Eugster & A.J.J.M. Vingerhoets, Psychological Aspects of In Vitro Fertilization: A Review, 48 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 575, 580–81 (1999) (finding that anxiety and depression are among the 
most common reactions to treatment); Catherine H. Garner et al., supra note 194, at 13S 
(concluding that 64 percent of women undergoing IVF reported depressive symptoms as 
measured by a modified Beck Depression Inventory after an unsuccessful IVF cycle); John 
Wright et al., Psychological Distress and Infertility: Men and Women Respond Differently, 55 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 100, 104 (1991) (finding that infertile women had higher levels of 
depressive symptoms than their partners).  The stage and form of infertility diagnosis 
seem to affect psychological distress; definitive diagnoses of infertility produce significantly 
higher depression scores than unexplained or undiagnosed infertility, and patients un-
dergoing infertility-related surgery have significantly higher depression scores than those 
who did not.  Domar et al., supra, at 1162.  Women undergoing IVF, however, may not ex-
hibit higher levels of grief and depression than women undergoing artificial insemination.  
Michelle P. Lukse & Nicholas A. Vacc, Grief, Depression, and Coping in Women Undergoing In-
fertility Treatment, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245, 249–250 (1999) (finding that 56 
percent of IVF patients and 58 percent of patients who took ovulation-induction medica-
tion reported feelings of depression before beginning treatment, while 62 percent of IVF 
and 68 percent of ovulation-induction medication subjects reported feelings of depression 
four weeks after a negative pregnancy test).      
 200. Other sources conclude that anxiety, depression, and other mental health disord-
ers are not greater among infertile women than in the general population.  For example, a 
2009 World Health Organization report states that “a number of cohort comparison stu-
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dies . . . have found no significant difference in rates of psychiatric illness, other psychopa-
thology or personality factors between presumed fertile groups and those seeking infertili-
ty treatment, or between infertile groups and population norms, or between groups with 
infertility of different origin and duration.”  WORLD HEALTH ORG., MENTAL HEALTH 
ASPECTS OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 130 
(2009), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241563567_eng.pdf 
(citations omitted); R.J. Edelmann et al., Psychogenic Infertility: Some Findings, 12 J. 
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 163–68 (1991); A.P. Visser et al., Psychosocial 
Aspects of In Vitro Fertilization, 15 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 35–43 
(1994).  Literature reviews have also found no consistent relationship between infertility 
and emotional distress, and numerous studies conclude that most infertile women do not 
have clinical depression but may experience mood changes and lower self-worth.  See D. 
Brasile, B. Katsoff & J.H. Check, Moderate or Severe Depression is Uncommon in Women Seeking 
Infertility Therapy According to the Beck Depression Inventory, 33 CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 17 (2006); Jennifer Downey et al., Mood Disorders, Psychiatric 
Symptoms, and Distress in Women Presenting for Infertility Evaluation, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
425, 429 (1989) (finding no difference in psychiatric symptoms, measures of self-esteem 
and sexual functioning, or the percentage of infertile women versus controls experiencing 
a current or past episode of major depressive disorder); Christine Dunkel-Schetter & Mar-
ci Lobel, Psychological Reactions to Infertility, in INFERTILITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM STRESS AND 
COPING RESEARCH 29, 50 (Annette L. Stanton & Christine Dunkel-Schetter eds., 1991) 
(finding that “[e]mpirical evidence from scientifically rigorous research on the psycholog-
ical effects of infertility does not support contentions that specific reactions are com-
mon.”); M. T. Hearn et al., Psychological Characteristics of In Vitro Fertilization Participants, 156 
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 269, 272 (1987) (finding that couples undergoing IVF 
reported good quality of life and that women undergoing IVF did not differ from the 
normal sample with respect to depression and anxiety); John D. Paulson et al., An Investi-
gation of the Relationship Between Emotional Maladjustment and Infertility, 49 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 258, 261 (1988) (finding that “infertile women do not manifest significantly 
greater levels of emotional maladjustment than do women in general.”); Annette L. Stan-
ton & Sharon Danoff-Burg, Selected Issues in Women’s Reproductive Health: Psychological Perspec-
tives, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN’S HEALTH: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN RESEARCH 
AND APPLICATION 261, 275 (Annette L. Stanton & Sheryle J. Gallant eds., 1995) (finding 
that “the conceptualization of infertility as a uniform life crisis was not supported in the 
empirical literature”).   
Failure to observe clinical anxiety or symptoms of depression, however, does not indi-
cate that infertility patients experience no psychological distress; degrees of distress are 
observed during treatment phases, in particular lowered self-esteem and heightened guilt 
and self-blame as compared to fertile persons.  See Janet Beaurepaire et al., Psychosocial Ad-
justment to Infertility and Its Treatment: Male and Female Responses at Different Stages of IVF/ET 
Treatment, 38 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 229, 238 (1994) (comparing male and female res-
ponses at varying stages of fertility treatment and concluding that “a major difficulty faced 
by both men and women regardless of stage of treatment was anxiety”); J. Bernstein et al., 
Assessment of Psychological Dysfunction Associated with Infertility, 14 J. OBSTETRIC, 
GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 63–66 (1985); Victor J. Callan & John F. Hennessey, 
The Psychological Adjustment of Women Experiencing Infertility, 61 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 137, 
139 (1988) (finding that infertile women “perceived their lives as less interesting, more 
lonely and in general were less contented than mothers not experiencing fertility prob-
lems”); Daniluk, supra note 190, at 988 (comparing levels of depression in infertile couples 
at diagnosis and in later stages of treatment and finding that distress decreased as medical 
investigation continued); Kelly A. Morrow et al., Predictors of Psychological Distress Among In-
fertility Clinic Patients, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 163, 166 (1995) (concluding 
that the incidence and severity of psychological distress in infertile patients warrants psy-
chological evaluation and therapy); Nachtigall et al., supra note 188, at 116–18 (reporting 
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Specifically, studies show that an infertile individual’s mental 
health correlates to both infertility and treatment experiences.201  
Many IVF patients experience depressive symptoms before an IVF 
cycle, particularly if they have experienced multiple unsuccessful 
rounds.202  These symptoms, however, stem from patient apprehen-
sion over treatment outcome and not the procedures themselves.203  
Many other medical patients hope for a cure and experience pre-
treatment anxiety, yet we would not say that these worries undermine 
their ability to give informed consent to that procedure.  A failed IVF 
cycle is more likely to contribute to increased anxiety and depres-
sion.204  The consensus is that emotional strain increases over the first 
two years of treatment, peaking around year three.205
 
that women in infertile couples exhibited loss of self-esteem, feelings of stigma, role failure 
and perception of loss, regardless of whether a female infertility factor was present).  
  Thus, legal 
 201. The Psychological Impact of Infertility and Its Treatment, supra note 187, at 1.  For in-
stance, one study concluded that six months after either completing three IVF cycles with-
out becoming pregnant, women who were unable to conceive “had significantly higher levels 
of anxiety and depressive symptoms, poorer marital functioning, and higher levels of non-
communication and dissatisfaction with their sexual relationship” compared with women 
who became pregnant; “after unsuccessful treatment, anxiety and depression increased . . . .  
More than a fifth of the women showed subclinical forms of anxiety and/or depression.”  
Schmidt, supra note 185, at 379.  Studies differ, however, on whether the duration of infer-
tility or infertility treatment itself more accurately predicts depression.  See id. (referring to 
infertility as a “chronic stressor” that couples must continually address); cf. Vivian Kraaij et 
al., Cognitive Coping and Depressive Symptoms in Definitive Infertility: A Prospective Study, 29 J. 
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 9, 13–14 (2008) (finding that infertile pa-
tients reported fewer depressive symptoms two years after the initial interview).  Depres-
sion scores may not decline significantly until after year six.  Domar et al., supra note 194, 
at 1161.  Thus, researchers have concluded that “[d]epression is apparently a very com-
mon and significant problem in the infertile population.”  Id. 
 202. Cousineau & Domar, supra note 177, at 299.  A 1998 study found that 54.1 percent 
of patients exhibited mild depressive symptoms before their cycles, and 19.4 percent expe-
rienced moderate to severe levels.  Demyttenaere et al., supra note 196, at 1028.   
 203. Bahman Baluch et al., What Is Stressful About In-Vitro Fertilization?, 71 PSYCHOL. REP. 
1187, 1189 (1992) (“[W]e  believe that . . . the psychological aspects of infertility are so 
great that worries about outcome overshadow concerns about the procedural aspects of 
treatment.”) (citations omitted). 
 204. One study of eighty-six couples who experienced failed IVF treatment found that 
66 percent of women and 40 percent of men reported symptoms of depression afterwards, 
and one-third still exhibited depressive symptoms eighteen months later.  D. Baram, E. 
Tourtelot, E. Muechler & K. Huang, Psychological Adjustment Following Unsuccessful In Vitro 
Fertilization, 8 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 181 (1988). 
 205. One study showed that emotional strain was moderately elevated during the first 
year of infertility, that it assumed more typical levels during year two, and that it increased 
during years three and beyond; marital adjustment and sexual satisfaction also deteri-
orated after year three.  Barbara J. Berg & John F. Wilson, Psychological Functioning Across 
Stages of Treatment for Infertility, 14 J. BEHAV. MED. 11, 11 (1991).  Similarly, a 2008 study 
found that a two-to-three-year history of infertility and treatment duration added to the 
prediction of psychological distress, and that two years after the initial interview the mean 
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scholars appear to pathologize emotional distress too early in the 
treatment process and overgeneralize and overemphasize the psycho-
logical impact of desperation or obsession to conceive.   
B.  Recognizing Infertile Women’s Capacity for Choice 
If women may effectively consent to abortion under social, physi-
cal, and temporal pressures, then surely they have the ability to give 
informed consent to ART.  When an infertile woman looks in the 
mirror, she likely sees someone with many other qualities besides in-
fertility.  But even if she regards herself as desperate, she still would 
insist that she can make informed decisions.  As Margarete Sande-
lowski remarks based on her interviews with infertile couples,  
My respondent infertile couples do not construct the “alter-
natives” as the “pain, humiliation, and danger of in vitro fer-
tilization” versus the “lowered self-esteem, devaluation, and 
loneliness of infertility.”  For them, the critical sets of op-
tions are trying to have a baby versus trying to get one; be-
coming a parent versus remaining without children; and, 
most importantly, having regrets for not pursuing a particu-
lar option versus having no regrets, even though they might 
remain child-free.  They see and carefully consider the op-
portunity and danger attendant to both medical and adop-
tive routes to parenthood.206
To these ends, liberal feminists in particular have sought to 
counter the anti-natalist perspectives on ART, particularly those of 
early radical feminists.  A strand of liberal feminist writing in the 
1970s and 1980s pleaded for “caring, connected, authentic, antivio-
lent stereotypes of motherhood,” strengthening arguments for “the 
return of agency to infertile women.”
 
207  Liberal feminist scholars in 
the late 1980s and 1990s continued to take up this cause,208
 
depression score was still above average although fewer depressive symptoms were re-
ported.  Kraaij et al., supra note 
 crediting 
201, at 9–10, 13–14.  Yet another study found that the 
third year of trying to conceive was associated with the highest depression scores; the re-
searchers hypothesized that “[i]t is possible that the third year is the most discouraging for 
patients; they are optimistic during the first 1 to 2 years, then begin to feel hopeless during 
the second to third year, and finally start to resolve their feelings or move on to other al-
ternatives . . . .”  Domar et al., supra note 199, at 1161.   
 206. Sandelowski, supra note 150, at 49. 
 207. Charis M. Thompson, Fertile Ground: Feminists Theorize Infertility, in INFERTILITY 
AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 52, 61 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van Balen eds., 2002). 
 208. See, e.g., Anne Woolelett, Infertility: From ‘Inside/Out’ to ‘Outside/In’, in REPRESENTING 
THE OTHER: A FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY READER 68, 68 (Sue Wilkinson & Celia Kitzinger 
 2012] INFERTILE WOMEN’S DECISION-MAKING AUTONOMY 377 
ART with the “potential to articulate new ways of embodying repro-
duction . . . refus[ing] to read new reproductive technologies as simp-
ly signing and sealing preexisting oppressive social orders.”209  They 
rejected the image of infertile women as coerced creatures because 
“there are no more introspective and self-conscious decision makers 
than couples compelled to find the way to parenthood.”210  Further, 
several commentators have affirmatively argued that ART could em-
power patients in numerous ways.211
Contemporary liberal feminists are most likely to focus on the 
negotiation of maternal stereotypes, experiential accounts of pa-
triarchy and infertility, the impact of increased fetal status and rights, 
and state concern about infertility.
   
212  Recent liberal feminist scholar-
ship develops more positive feminist images of infertile women, em-
phasizes that infertility is not an all-consuming condition, posits that 
stereotypes of desperation create caricatures of infertile women,213 
and recognizes motherhood’s advantages and drawbacks.214  This 
scholarship has helped to demonstrate that infertile women can de-
sire children for reasons that appear anything but irrational.215
 
eds., 1996) (discussing research that was “intended to represent infertile women whose 
voices and experiences . . . were omitted from current accounts of infertility”). 
  After 
 209. Thompson, supra note 173, at 64. 
 210. Sandelowski, supra note 150, at 43–44. 
 211. See, e.g., Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the 
Politics of Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD, AND 
MEDICINE 57, 72 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987) (“Like amniocentesis, in-vitro fertiliza-
tion, voluntary sterilization and other ‘male-dominated’ reproductive technologies, ultra-
sound imaging in pregnancy seems to evoke in many women a sense of greater control 
and self-empowerment than they would have if left to ‘traditional’ methods or ‘nature.’”). 
 212. Id. at 66–67.  
 213. Gayle Letherby, Challenging Dominant Discourses: Identity and Change and the Expe-
rience of ‘Infertility’ and ‘Involuntary Childlessness,’ 11 J. GENDER STUD. 277, 279 (2002) (stat-
ing that it is necessary to problematize the view that infertility becomes an individual’s 
master status). 
 214. Id. at 285; see also Julia McQuillan et al., The Importance of Motherhood Among Women 
in the Contemporary United States, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 477, 491–92 (2008) (analyzing the im-
portance of motherhood among mothers and non-mothers, concluding that mothers can 
simultaneously value work and motherhood, and that the “importance of work and the 
importance of motherhood are positively correlated, and for non-mothers, there is no as-
sociation,” debunking the notion that work-oriented women must be anti-child or that mo-
therhood-oriented woman must be “anti-work”).   
 215. See Miriam Ulrich & Ann Weatherall, Motherhood and Infertility: Viewing Motherhood 
Through the Lens of Infertility, 10 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 323, 335 (2000).  Ulrich and Wea-
therall focused on women’s reasons for wanting children (reasons cited were natural in-
stinct, a natural relationship stage, social expectation, and the end result of a decisionmak-
ing process), the reality of mothering after successful infertility treatment, and how 
women spoke of infertility (descriptions included an awareness of its constructed nature, a 
rejection of infertility as being one’s whole identity, as illness and a medical problem, and 
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interviewing infertile women about their treatment experiences, lib-
eral feminist Gayle Letherby observed that respondents view despera-
tion or obsession as only one aspect of their identities, and are people 
“with feelings of despair rather than ‘desperate people.’”216  Despera-
tion may in fact be a conscious strategy; infertile women may even ap-
pear “desperate” if it will “improve the provision of medical and emo-
tional support, or [if they] felt that others were using this strategy.”217  
Moreover, emotional distress may be a “reasonable, rather than an ir-
rational, response” to infertility if one is barren yet feels that the 
“mandate for motherhood [i]s compelling.”218
The liberal feminist perspective also prompts us to be mindful of 
the dangers of overreliance on such false consciousness arguments, 
for to deny the authenticity of infertile women’s desire to conceive is 
to deny their free will and autonomy as well.
   
219
Feminism is not about rejecting femininity, including maternity 
and motherhood.  A feminist’s belief in and opposition to patriarchal 
hegemony does not automatically entail voluntary childlessness.  Cer-
tain choices, such as motherhood, will inevitably align with patriar-
chal preferences—a fact that the women who make these choices, as 
well as feminists, have to accept.  While it is important to recognize 
how certain behaviors support patriarchy, it is also crucial to realize 
that feminism is not only about appearing not to follow patriarchal 
  We cannot condemn 
an individual’s desire to conceive simply because it might have been 
culturally conditioned.  This absolutist stance ignores the fact that 
many everyday decisions, including life-changing determinations, are 
also culturally conditioned.  Scholarship goes too far when it labels as 
“coerced” every woman whose reproductive choices align with pa-
triarchal ideals.  We must continually and adamantly reject the notion 
that a woman’s desire to conceive is nothing but a coerced and there-
fore non-autonomous decision.  Unfortunately, this idea has been 
fairly influential, reinforcing mainstream stereotypes and informing 
the more conventional feminist ideal of motherhood on women’s 
terms and timing.   
 
as a failure).  Id. at 327–33.  The authors concluded that a central theme of the accounts 
was “the importance of increasing awareness and support” for infertile women, “[t]he 
need to promote socially valued roles for women other than motherhood and the need to 
broaden what it means to ‘mother.’”  Id. at 335.  
 216. Letherby, supra note 213, at 283. 
 217. Id. at 282.   
 218. Ulrich & Weatherall, supra note 215, at 334–35.   
 219. Sandelowski, supra note 150, at 40 (“Feminist discourse that emphasizes the lack of 
authentic desire in women, or that allows women no free will beyond the will inculcated by 
patriarchal culture, itself permits women no volition, no agency at all.”). 
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dictates, but also about ensuring a respectful cultural space for wom-
en’s choices.  Freedom of choice exists when a decision maker is 
aware of her alternatives—the ability to remain childless or to attempt 
to conceive—and of their likely emotional, psychological, social, and 
financial consequences.  Frustratingly, an infertile woman who is 
aware of patriarchal conditioning and of her freedom to remain 
childless but still ardently desires a child can never articulate the au-
thenticity of her choice if her consent is seen as inevitably coerced 
because of her sex.  Accordingly, overreliance on false consciousness 
theories forces women to trade patriarchal subordination for feminist 
oppression—a fact recognized by more contemporary liberal femin-
ists.220
Limiting our focus to coercion and its role in reproductive deci-
sion making, however, is at once too simplistic and too broad.  On oc-
casion, we do restrict an individual’s choices in order to enhance au-
tonomy; for example, we protect employees from coercion by limiting 
the number of hours per day they may work, and we do not generally 
believe that such constraints are disrespectful.  The reproductive 
choices that women considering fertility treatment face, however, are 
different in nature; the decision to reproduce and the freedom to 
choose how to reproduce are more fundamental to individual identity 
and personhood.  The pressing questions, then, are not whether re-
productive coercion exists or whether all reproductive choices are 
coerced, but why we tolerate some forms of coercion and not others, 
when restricting individuals’ choices is an appropriate response to 
coercion and when it is not, and what other options we might have 
for reducing coercive influences other than decision-making con-
straints.  Because reasoning and decision making are at the heart of 
autonomy, we may begin to answer these questions by considering 
more relational and reflexive conceptions of autonomy that acknowl-
edge emotion’s important contribution to decision making.  
 
C.  Reassessing Emotion’s Role in Medical and Reproductive Decision 
Making 
Analyzing contrasting constructions of women as reproductive 
decision makers also provides a case study of how we as social and cul-
tural actors believe that it is appropriate to understand and negotiate 
the role of emotion in medical and reproductive decision making.  
 
 220. See, e.g., Sandelowski, supra note 150, at 39 (recognizing that “[r]eproductive tech-
nologies are tied to patriarchal concepts of womanhood,” while “[i]nfertile women also 
find themselves confronted with a group of feminists who suspect their motivations to pro-
create”). 
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The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence indicates that emotion 
has long been recognized as a vital part of assessing the pregnant 
woman’s various options and of evaluating her social and relational 
positions.  After Gonzales v. Carhart, certain negative emotions, most 
obviously regret, are now judged an inherent part of the abortion de-
cision.221  Foreclosing certain abortion options (such as “partial-birth” 
abortion), providing certain types of information to women expe-
riencing crisis pregnancies, and enforcing mandatory waiting periods 
are all designed to “protect” women from suffering regret.222  As pre-
viously discussed, feminist legal scholars and those who support a view 
of competent decision making that incorporates emotion counter 
these rulings by: (1) contending that women facing crisis pregnancies 
are capable and effective reproductive decision makers; (2) contend-
ing that emotion is an inherent part of not only an informed abortion 
decision but also of social and cultural judgments concerning the 
propriety of an abortion decision; and (3) acknowledging that the 
emotional characteristics of an abortion decision need not compel 
the normative judgment that women act irrationally or in a morally 
untrustworthy way when confronted with such emotionally charged 
decisions.223
In the infertility context, however, some legal scholars evaluate 
the emotion in ART decision making very differently, arguing that in-
fertile women’s desperation to conceive ostensibly leads them down 
dangerous paths to treatment decisions that jeopardize their physical, 
emotional, and financial well-being.
   
224  I dispute the conclusion that 
some women’s desire—indeed, desperate need—to abort a crisis 
pregnancy is qualitatively different from the desire, or even desperate 
need, to conceive.225
 
 221. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (noting that the decision whether to have an abortion is 
“fraught with emotional consequence”). 
  While infertility is an emotional issue, what is 
“emotional” is not inherently “irrational,” nor do women’s emo-
tions—or emotional distress—rob them of the ability to make in-
formed reproductive choices.  This Article attempts to extend legal 
scholars’ contentions in the abortion context to the infertility setting 
by (1) asserting that infertile women are autonomous decision makers 
despite the fact that infertility and infertility treatment are emotional-
 222. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 223. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: 
Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28 
(2008) (characterizing the argument that emotional factors bias women’s decisions about 
abortion as “classically paternalistic”). 
 224. See supra Part II.A. 
 225. See infra Part III.A–B.     
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ly challenging experiences that compel emotionally charged deci-
sions, and (2) advocating a view of competent decision making that 
acknowledges the value of and incorporates emotional elements.  I do 
not want to reject the notion of desperation itself, but rather the in-
sinuation that desperation (and emotion in general) warps infertile 
women’s decision-making competency; in other words, desperation—
whatever its characteristics and however strongly it is felt—must be 
decoupled from irrationality.226
Incorporating emotion into theories of medical decision-making 
competence is a necessary step in recognizing infertile women as ca-
pable decision makers.  In Western countries, competence is essen-
tially seen as cognitive.
  
227  Decisions made by competent individuals 
are to be respected because they are the product of circumspection; 
they are intellectual judgments that certain options are desirable be-
cause their potential outcomes increase well-being.228  The choices of 
individuals with “disordered” minds, however, are not seen in the 
same light because their decisions are not the production of compe-
tent thought.  Thus, intervention in incompetent individuals’ deci-
sion-making processes is more justifiable because those individuals 
cannot act in their own best interest.229  Significantly, “competence is 
decision-relative,” meaning that “[a] person may be competent to 
make a particular decision at a particular time, under certain circums-
tances, but incompetent to make another decision, or even the same 
decision, under different conditions.”230  The size of any incompetent 
group must be sharply limited because a declaration of incompetency 
is the most “profound infringement” of citizens’ rights.231





 226. See infra Part IV. 
 which have enunciated and applied tests for determining 
competency that include several key capacities: “the abilities: to ex-
press a choice; to understand relevant information; to appreciate the 
significance of that information for one’s own situation; and to reason 
with relevant information so as to engage in a logical process of 
 227. See, e.g., Charland, supra note 13, at 363–64 (noting that competence appears to be 
“primarily and exclusively a cognitive notion”). 
 228. Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 378. 
 229. Id. 
 230. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF 
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 18 (1989). 
 231. Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 378. 
 232. Id.; see also Jessica Willen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of 
Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 348–49 (1996) (noting 
that “in most jurisdictions only a court can decide if a person is incompetent”).  
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weighing options.”233  Appreciation, in particular, “refers to patients’ 
recognition that information given to them about their disorder and 
potential treatment is significant for and applicable to their own cir-
cumstances,”234 including not only understanding but applying ab-
stract information on treatment risks and benefits to one’s own cir-
cumstances.235  This is typically seen as a primarily factual assessment 
related to intellectual capacity.236  A “patient’s belief must be substan-
tially irrational, unrealistic, or a considerable distortion of reality” be-
fore she will be said to fail to appreciate medical information.237  It is 
on the grounds of appreciation that ART scholars fault infertility pa-
tients’ decision making as the product of “denial, distortion, and de-
lusions.”238
In contrast, numerous researchers have argued that medical de-
cision-making competence is not entirely cognitive in nature and 
should be expanded to include patients’ emotional capacities.
   
239  Ac-
cording to Joseph LeDoux, cognition and emotion are “separate but 
interacting mental functions” in numerous neurophysiological struc-
tures and activities.240  Emotions actually inform the decision-making 
process because they prompt patients to think through conflicting 
“first-order desires”241 in line with closely held values.242
 
 233. Appelbaum, supra note 
  Antonio Da-
12, at 379; see also Berg et al., supra note 232, at 348–49.   
 234. Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: Measures of Abili-
ties Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 128 (1995). 
 235. Charland, supra note 13, at 363. 
 236. Id. at 362. But see BETTY COX WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 71 (1994) (ac-
knowledging that “the consensus is that competence to consent lies exclusively within the 
domain of the intellect,” but suggesting that an “exaggerated emphasis on the intellect . . . 
seems inadequate”).   
 237. THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO 
TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 45 (1998) (em-
phasis removed).  To qualify as a “failure of Appreciation,” the patient’s belief must also 
“be the consequences of impaired cognition or affect” and “be relevant to the patient’s 
treatment decision.”  Id. at 47–48 (emphasis removed).  
 238. See Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 380 (discussing the views of scholars who disagree 
with a view of appreciation that “focus[es] exclusively on cognitive functions”). 
 239. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN xii–xiii (1994) (suggesting that “emotion and feeling are indispensable for 
rationality”); RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 4, 6 (1991) (finding it “in-
conceivable” to divorce emotion from cognition); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: 
THE MYTH AND NATURE OF HUMAN EMOTION 25–26 (1976) (seeking to “break down . . . 
unnecessary conflicts between reason and passions”); WHITE, supra note 236, at 70–71 (ar-
guing that “mental function” incorporates both intellect and emotionality). 
 240. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF 
EMOTIONAL LIFE 68–69 (1996). 
 241. See WHITE, supra note 236, at 130–31 (“First-order desires are desires for some-
thing . . . (e.g., the desire for food).”). 
 242. Id. at 131, 137. 
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masio has observed that individuals with frontal lobe damage score 
within normal ranges on cognitive testing but often prove incapable 
of social and relational tasks such as keeping a marriage intact or 
holding a job, which he attributes to an inability to experience or 
process emotion.243  Damasio’s research suggests that frontal lobe 
damage cripples the human ability to consciously or unconsciously 
organize and utilize relevant past experiences and contemporary situ-
ational information, and therefore similarly cripples the ability to 
make competent decisions.244  Others assert that personal values 
guide patients’ decisions, and observe that emotions are integral in 
evolving and discriminating among value systems.245  Therefore, as 
Louis Charland queries, “If emotions are essential to everyday deci-
sion making and inseparably intertwined with other cognitive func-
tions and capacities, then why are they not relevant to medical deci-
sion making in treatment and research contexts?”246
Processes of appreciation, a central component of decision-
making competence, also rely upon emotion.
 
247  “[O]ne interprets 
and evaluates the significance of events and situations in the envi-
ronment (biological and social) in light of learned or pre-set goals 
and expectations,” including values and preferences, and thereby 
“comes to attach personal meaning to situations and events.”248  This is 
an active, not a passive, task, involving a “negotiation” between an in-
dividual and her environment that is inherently involuntary, recur-
sive, and revisionary.249
Borrowing from the work of Richard Lazarus, Terry Maroney ex-
plains how emotions influence cognitive appraisal:  
   
In perhaps the most influential contemporary theoretical 
account of cognitive appraisal and emotion, Richard Lazarus 
posited that emotions are bound to core relational themes. 
Core relational themes are . . . captured as an “if-then” for-
mulation: if a person appraises his or her relationship to the 
environment in a particular way then a specific emotion al-
ways follows. . . .  Though “biological universals link the if 
 
 243. See DAMASIO, supra note 239, at 35–38, 54–58. 
 244. Id. at 38–39. 
 245. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 230, at 25 (asserting that “a competent deci-
sion-maker also requires a set of values or conception of what is good”). 
 246. Charland, supra note 13, at 365. 
 247. Id. at 359–60.   
 248. Id. at 365–66 (discussing RICHARD S. LAZARUS & BERNICE N. LAZARUS, PASSION AND 
REASON: MAKING SENSE OF OUR EMOTIONS 143–45 (1994)). 
 249. Id. at 366. 
 384 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:339 
with the then,” individual and cultural factors “affect the if” 
by influencing the appraisal.  All persons who perceive their 
situation as satisfying one of the core relational themes will 
experience the corresponding emotion.  But that percep-
tion is highly variable, for what circumstances are thought to 
constitute “a demeaning offense” or an “irrevocable loss” 
will depend on a person’s worldview, including internalized 
norms of her culture as well as her own experience, goals, 
motivations, and beliefs.250
Emotion, then, helps individuals to determine whether and how cer-
tain choices are personally meaningful, and thus aids the process of 
appreciating treatment effects and outcomes.
 
251
Finally, feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar’s research on “outlaw 
emotions” illustrates how emotion can aid decision making, enhanc-
ing individual autonomy.
   
252  According to Jaggar, we as members of 
particular societies and cultures absorb conventional standards and 
values (which usually benefit dominant social groups) to the point 
that they are “built into the foundation of our emotional constitu-
tion.”253  On occasion, however, individuals may escape these estab-
lished patterns of emotional control when placed in problematic so-
cial situations in which they discover it is impossible to feel the 
conventional emotions they know they are “supposed” to expe-
rience.254  Jaggar proffers the example of a female employee who, 
when subjected to the catcalls of her male colleagues, feels uncom-
fortable or angry rather than flattered.255  Upon learning that others 
have had similar emotional experiences, the woman finds that her 
outlaw emotions are not so unusual after all, and realizes that “the ba-
sis exists for forming a subculture defined by perceptions, norms, and 
values that systematically oppose the prevailing perceptions, norms, 
and values.”256
 
 250. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
851, 891–92 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
  Thus, “outlaw emotions may be politically (because 
 251. See WHITE, supra note 236, at 128–29 (“Persons relate present and preferred states 
of affairs to their well-being by paying attention to felt emotions and identifying whether 
or not those are preferred.”). 
 252. Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in WOMEN, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 166, 180–84 (Ann 
Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 2d ed. 1996). 
 253. Id. at 179.  
 254. Id. at 180. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
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epistemologically) subversive.”257  Outlaw emotions can challenge 
conventional ways of seeing the world, and may motivate new direc-
tions in critical research, leading to more complex, reflexive, and di-
versified perspectives on affairs.258
Accepting the indispensability of appropriate emotions to 
knowledge means no more (and no less) than that discor-
dant emotions should be attended to seriously and respect-
fully rather than condemned, ignored, discounted, or sup-
pressed.   
  Thus, far from being debilitating, 
emotion is crucial to processes of evaluation and decision making; as 
Jaggar asserts, emotions are essential to knowledge no matter whether 
social convention labels them as appropriate or inappropriate: 
 Just as appropriate emotions may contribute to the devel-
opment of knowledge so the growth of knowledge may con-
tribute to the development of appropriate emotions.259
Ultimately, the overall effect of acknowledging emotion’s role in 
processes of knowledge production, including decision making, is 
enhanced moral and political individual autonomy. 
 
Medical treatment choices are not appreciated fully unless an in-
dividual patient feels that these choices are personally significant.260  
Electing to proceed with treatment affirms a patient’s sense after 
weighing the various options in light of anticipated goals closely held 
values, and awareness of chances of success, that a treatment option is 
viable and valuable as a possible means to desired ends, such as con-
ceiving a child.  Hence, Charland notes, such decisions “often involve 
very emotive and existential senses of ‘utility.’”261
Of course, many critical and complex tasks lay ahead of us before 
we can determine if and in what way emotional capacity should be-
come part of a model of competency.  We need a clear definition of 
emotional capacity, reason to believe that emotional capacity can be 
defined and assessed, and a clear idea of what degree or type of im-
pairment is our focus.
  What emotions 
might be particularly salient in a decision to seek fertility treatment?  
Fear, hope, determination, perseverance, and courage—all may be 
integral components of decision making, and are likely to be far more 
prevalent than extreme emotions such as desperation or obsession. 
262
 
 257. Id. 
  What constitutes a valid emotional test is a 
 258. Id. at 181. 
 259. Id. at 183. 
 260. Charland, supra note 13, at 368. 
 261. Id. at 369–70. 
 262. Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 384–85. 
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tremendous obstacle—how can one tell that a patient’s feelings are 
felt too strongly?  Or whether they warp assessments of well-being, or 
whether they overwhelm the decision-making process?  These are all 
high stakes questions; at immediate risk are patients’ moral and bodi-
ly integrity and autonomy, health, and constitutional rights.  None-
theless, we can recognize the merits of considering how emotions can 
enhance as well as detract from an understanding of medical and re-
productive decision making. 
D.  Reevaluating Rationality, Subjectivity, and Relational Autonomy in 
Assessing Competent Decision Making 
Emotion is not just important in helping patients make medical 
decisions; it also plays a key role in how others evaluate those deci-
sions in assessing their rationality.  An individual is seen as competent 
if she can give rational reasons for a particular decision—a hard-to-
define requirement referring to justifications that one would say are 
the product of “good sense” or “sound logic.”263  This evaluator crite-
rion is “process-centered,” and depends upon the characteristics of 
the decision maker as well as the social and cultural milieus in which 
the deciding individual—and the individual assessing the quality of 
the decision—is embedded.264  Benjamin Freedman identifies two 
ways in which a decision maker’s reasons may fail the rationality test: 
(1) deciding upon the basis of premises she knows to be false (such as 
refusing a breast biopsy in the belief it would affect future reproduc-
tive ability), and (2) producing reasons, which although potentially 
true, fail to support the conclusion drawn—in short, non sequiturs 
(such as refusing surgery simply because it is Tuesday).265
A problem arises, however, when a decision to proceed with 
medical treatment makes sense from the patient’s perspective but 
does not appear quite so logical to others.  Not only do we routinely 
make ostensibly irrational medical decisions, but we evaluate and 
judge others for doing this very same thing.  For example, we think it 
is illogical when smokers not only acknowledge smoking’s health risks 
but overestimate them, and still make the ostensibly “irrational” deci-
 
 
 263. See Benjamin Freedman, Competence, Marginal and Otherwise: Concepts and Ethics, 4 
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 53, 64 (1981) (asserting that “an individual is competent if he can 
supply rational reasons for his decision”). 
 264. Id. at 64–65. 
 265. Id. at 64. 
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sion to keep smoking.266  We find it unreasonable that many sexually 
active adults are familiar with HIV and AIDS prevention and the rules 
of “safe sex,” yet fail to take these very same steps to protect them-
selves.267
Rationality thus provides an incomplete framework for this inves-
tigation into the evaluation of patients’ medical decisions.  Its insuffi-
ciency is underscored by the fact that law and emotion scholars and 
others have rejected a Cartesian or positivist dichotomy between emo-
tion and reason.
   
268
Let us begin by briefly explicating legal scholars’ constructions of 
infertile women as “desperate” or “obsessed.”
  We should therefore pursue this inquiry outside 
of rationality’s shaky structure in order to effectively consider other 
factors such as the relational positioning of the decision maker vis-à-
vis the individual evaluating both herself and her decisions, the pro-
priety of concentrating on negative emotions such as regret, the social 
impact of any alleged negative consequences of suboptimal ART deci-
sion making, and finally how best to derive more accurate and holistic 
conceptions of autonomy. 
269  Perhaps Jaggar’s 
concept of outlaw emotions might be useful here;270
 
 266. See W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 7, 19–21 (1992) (sug-
gesting that while people tend to overestimate highly publicized smoking risks, they “will 
smoke more often than they should”). 
 it might be that 
society feels that infertile women do feel a form of desperation so pro-
found that it threatens competency not only because women in par-
ticular should feel emotion, but also because they should feel it so 
acutely that it influences their decision-making processes to a degree 
incompatible with conventional positivist conceptions of a rational, 
competent decision.  In a related sense, it might be that these scho-
lars’ conceptions of infertile women are the products of what Maro-
ney terms “emotional common sense,” defined as “what one thinks 
she simply knows about emotions, based on personal experience, so-
 267. See ELISA J. SOBO, CHOOSING UNSAFE SEX: AIDS-RISK DENIAL AMONG 
DISADVANTAGED WOMEN 25–26 (1995) (arguing that statistics show “[p]eople do have the 
facts [about HIV and AIDS], but they do very little with them”). 
 268. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2003–12, 2027–33 (2010) (arguing in favor of the “utility of analyzing 
the emotions in responding to concrete legal problems”); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional 
Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2007) (suggesting that “emotional biases” are 
important “to legal decisionmaking”); Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Tax-
onomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120–21 (2006) (noting that the 
study of law is becoming more receptive to issues of human emotion). 
 269. See supra Part II.A. 
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 252–259. 
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cialization, and other forms of casual empiricism.”271  We rely on 
these common-sense ideas to help evaluate “the legitimacy and relia-
bility of the information emotion imparts and the conclusions it com-
pels.”272  Our emotional common sense discloses much about our “af-
filiations, beliefs, and values,” as well as what “normative ends” we 
view as the proper outcome of a given situation; it “both colors inter-
pretation of evidence and manifests in selective perspective-taking.”273
As Maroney indicates, individuals with differing emotional com-
mon sense will also prioritize different outcomes, and so “it is not 
possible to say one [view] is right and the other is not.”
   
274  If emotion-
al common sense is used to gauge the lived experience of others, es-
pecially those facing decisions or diagnoses that we do not, then we 
might assume too much similarity between our emotional common 
sense and those of the individuals whose experience and decisions we 
are evaluating.275  Maroney terms this inaccurate conflation a “false 
consensus,” and warns that emotional common sense may be used to 
inject such “inaccurate suppositions” into the law, thereby enacting 
specific sets of values that may very well “ignore the equally legitimate 
worldviews of others.”276  In this situation, she cautions, “[e]motional 
common sense represents one way in which law may pass contentious 
judgments of value on by passing them off as uncontestable matters of 
fact.”277
Emotional common sense is also marked by “extraordinary in-
consistency,” in that “[d]irectly opposing folk beliefs may be held si-
multaneously and will be selectively invoked . . . .”
 
278  Maroney faults 
the majority in Carhart for relying upon “a common-sense judgment 
as to the emotional bond between mothers and children,” and “im-
put[ing] this bond to pregnant women and fetuses, . . . driv[ing] the 
resulting assessment of emotional reality for post-abortive women.”279
 
 271. Maroney, supra note 
  
Thus, Maroney asserts:  
250, at 854. 
 272. Id. at 854–55. 
 273. Id. at 858. 
 274. See id. at 864–68 (noting that “[d]irectly opposing folk beliefs,” such as “haste 
makes waste” and “he who hesitates is lost” can both be “right,” because “common sense 
often will bear no relation to ‘truth’ in an absolute sense but instead will signal a person’s 
appraisal of the specific attributes of a situation as it relates to her own beliefs”). 
 275. Id. at 864. 
 276. Id. at 864, 866. 
 277. Id. at 902. 
 278. Id. at 866. 
 279. Id. at 889. 
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When the [Supreme] Court adopts as relevant to the rights 
of others the amicus parties’ stories of grief, guilt, loss, and 
lowered self-esteem, it adopts the valuations and beliefs lead-
ing to those emotional outputs and forces a false consensus 
on them . . . ignor[ing] other permissible meaning struc-
tures as to those phenomena.280
Maroney’s analysis compels another question: what motivates 
scholars’ concerns over infertile patients’ decisions to proceed with 
fertility treatment?  Is it because they perceive that these women are 
especially vulnerable?  Or because they fear that these women may 
elect unadvisable choices, making “bad” financial decisions or assum-
ing unnecessary health risks and procedures that they will come to 
rue?  The exact reasons for concern have been left unspecified, but it 
is difficult to think of a more likely motivation than protecting infer-
tile women from regret.  Even if the assumption is that infertile wom-
en are more vulnerable to manipulation than others (which has also 
been said of women facing crisis pregnancies), at bottom, concern 
over this vulnerability stems from fear that vulnerable individuals 
cannot fully appreciate the stakes of their decisions or may be maneu-
vered into making choices that are not in their best interest and that 
they will later lament.
 
281
The logic implicit in current constructions of infertile women as 
desperate or obsessed seems to imply that, from the perspectives of 
scholars who have accepted or utilized such images, fertility treatment 
is an inherently regrettable option that one would have to be highly 
distressed—desperate—to accept.
   
282  But ART scholars’ opinions re-
flect their own worldviews and value judgments, and not necessarily 
those of all or even most infertile individuals, fertility patients, or in-
deed other law professors.  These scholars weigh the high financial 
expenditures associated with treatment, its short- and long-term side 
effects, and “low” chances of success, assign varying importance to 
each, and see a choice that is very likely to lead to patient regret.283  
But infertility patients clearly weigh these factors very differently, most 
likely according higher priority to the possibility of achieving concep-
tion.284
 
 280. Id. at 901. 
  It is no wonder that these two groups have such markedly dif-
ferent views of the rationality of pursuing fertility treatment. 
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47. 
 282. See supra text accompanying note 50.   
 283. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
 284. See Sandelowski, supra note 150, at 48 (stating that infertile couples prioritized try-
ing to conceive and failing over not trying to conceive at all). 
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If scholarly concern stems from an assessment that infertility pa-
tients will very likely regret their treatment decisions in the short or 
long term, and this assumption is incorporated into normative rec-
ommendations without actual empirical evidence as to who is likely to 
suffer regret or under what circumstances, then trouble looms on the 
horizon.  This mirrors the difficulties that reproductive rights scholars 
contend are raised by Justice Kennedy’s insistence in Carhart that 
women seeking partial-birth abortions would experience regret.285  In 
short, in both contexts, Justices and scholars “signal[] that [they] re-
gard[] such regret as being a significant part of the natural order of 
things: women should feel these things, and therefore many of them 
will.”286
Behavioral law and economics research on regret aversion helps 
illustrate why this approach is inappropriate.  Regret aversion occurs 
when a person makes a decision calculated to reduce the possibility of 
post-decision regret.
  And, in both contexts, regret is used to justify concerns about 
women’s reproductive decision-making capacity. 
287  After making a decision, the decision maker 
compares the actual end result to what she feels the end result would 
have been had she chosen differently; if she believes another choice 
would have led to a better outcome, then she will not only regret her 
decision, but will take estimations of regret into account when making 
future decisions to try to minimize her sense of regret.288  Empirical 
research has documented regret aversion in consumer purchases, 
doctors’ and patients’ medical decision making, adolescent sexual 
behavior, negotiation behavior, and gambling.289  Indeed, one study 
has concluded that IVF patients are motivated to undergo IVF to pre-
vent feelings of regret.290  Behavioral law and economic scholars have 
asserted that regret aversion is a form of hindsight bias that, like other 
forms of cognitive bias, prompts people to make irrational deci-
sions.291
 
 285. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
  But if it is inappropriate for someone to make a decision 
 286. Maroney, supra note 250, at 894. 
 287. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 69. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 70–72. 
 290. Tjeerd Tymstra, The Imperative Character of Medical Technology and the Meaning of ‘An-
ticipated Decision, Regret’, 5 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 207, 210–11 (1989). 
 291. See, e.g., Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive 
Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1460, 1468, 1474–
76 (2006) (defining cognitive biases as “subconscious mental processes that impair ration-
al thought-processes and ultimately lead to ‘irrational’ choices”).  One such cognitive bias 
is “hindsight bias,” which “refers to the tendency of individuals to overestimate the extent 
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based on regret aversion, it also should be inappropriate for a third 
party to impose regret aversion upon a decision maker to prevent her 
from making that choice.  In other words, while we must accept that 
people face limitations as decision makers by allowing for cognitive 
biases, we do not have to advocate for these cognitive biases by forec-
losing the decision altogether.  Such a step seems more in line with 
Aldous Huxley’s dystopian novel Brave New World, in which infertile 
women would be pacified by hallucinogenic Soma pills and sent on 
their way.292




Cancer patients, for instance, often choose between several un-
appealing treatments with varying side effects and chances of success.  
 to conceive a child mischaracterize their emotional stake in 
obtaining fertility treatment.  It distorts their desire for a child into a 
vague, static, oversimplified abstraction, when in reality this desire, 
like other life goals, is a vibrant, revisionary, and subjective aspiration 
shaped by many factors.  Ironically, however, these constructions are 
positive in one respect: they recognize that emotion affects medical 
and reproductive decision making, and indicate that legal scholars 
have already incorporated an emotional element into models of deci-
sion-making competence, albeit in a problematic manner.  Accepting 
that emotion is an integral part of decision making that can assist 
women in making truly informed reproductive decisions allows us to 
see that infertile women have excellent—and rational—reasons for 
pursuing infertility treatment, such as a desire to conceive children 
(which may include having a child biologically related to one or both 
parents) or a yearning for the experience of gestating and giving 
birth to a child, among other goals.  Reasons for pursuing treatment 
stem from a combination of factors that include both emotional and 
non-emotional components—indeed, the very same combination of 
desires, values, and factual, non-subjective considerations that prompt 
the vast majority of fertile couples to have children.  And yet we rarely 
question whether such couples are rational in their decisions to start 
families.  Infertile women pursuing treatment hope that technology 
will allow them to conceive, just as medical patients with different di-
agnoses elect a particular medical treatment in hope for a cure.   
 
to which they anticipated the fruition of a particular event.”  McCann asserts that the ef-
fects of hindsight bias are exacerbated by regret aversion.  Id. at 1475. 
 292. In Huxley’s novel, Soma is a pleasure drug that the World State government uses 
to maintain control over its citizens.  ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 53–54 (Harper 
Perennial 2006) (1932).    
 293. See supra Part II.A. 
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Of course, the risks faced by cancer patients and infertility patients 
are by no means the same; cancer patients unquestionably face more 
dire outcomes than infertile patients who are otherwise healthy.  They 
stand between treatment and the grave, not between potential con-
ception and a childless life.  Nonetheless, this comparison suggests 
that a treatment’s utility—and its rationality—may lie in the eye of the 
beholder.  Having to choose between treating a disorder or admitting 
that a cherished goal—be it living or conceiving—is unattainable in-
spires so many to pluck the fruit of possibility, regardless of whether it 
hangs high or low.   
Research indicates that cancer patients are more likely than 
members of a non-cancer patient control group to accept “intensive 
treatments for a potentially small benefit.”294  A study led by Dr. Mau-
rice L. Slevin, consultant physician at St. Bartholomew’s and Homer-
ton Hospitals in London, reports that patients’ attitudes likely change 
dramatically upon a cancer diagnosis, rendering them “likely to ac-
cept any treatment that offers them some possible benefit and hope, 
however slight,” because they “find it difficult to accept circumstances 
in which there are no therapeutic options” and “appear[] to regard a 
minute chance of possible benefit as worth while, whatever the 
cost.”295
It would be easy to conclude that this is an irrational deci-
sion resulting from the tremendous stress imposed on these 
patients by their disease. This is by no means clear, however; 
it may be that the only people who can evaluate such life 
and death decisions are those faced with them.
  Yet, the study authors are reluctant to judge the cancer pa-
tients or even their decisions to be “irrational”:  
296
If one extends this study’s conclusions to infertility, the resulting 
scholarship might not be so much a lesson about desperation, obses-
sion, or irrational decision making as it would be about changes in 
values due to a perceived crisis and ensuing changes in treatment 
perspectives.  There is a difference between being an outsider looking 
into the experience of cancer or infertility, and an insider who must 
make decisions to deal with these diagnoses.  Odds of success offer 
   
 
 294. Maurice L. Slevin et al., Attitudes to Chemotherapy: Comparing Views of Patients with 
Cancer with Those of Doctors, Nurses, and General Public, 300 BRIT. MED. J. 1458, 1459 (1990). 
 295. Id. at 1460. 
 296. Id.  There has been some attention focused, however, on how cancer patients’ 
emotional vulnerabilities affect their decisionmaking abilities.  See, e.g., James Rickert, Let-
ter to the Editor, Cancer Care: Deciding Where to Go, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A26; Nata-
sha Singer, Cancer Center Ads, Appealing to Emotions at a Fragile Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2009, at A1. 
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the potential for hope, however thin.  If cancer patients who prioritize 
life choose a treatment option with terrible side effects and little 
chance of success, who are we to say this is irrational if it is the only 
way they may achieve their goal?   
The side effects of IVF are much less serious than those asso-
ciated with chemotherapy, and IVF has fairly good chances of success 
for many, if not most, patients, and these odds are continuously im-
proving with technological advances in reproductive medicine.297
A more detailed focus on autonomy also begs the question of 
who exactly is affected if the decision maker were to make a subop-
timal choice; the more people who are negatively affected or harmed 
by the choice, the more compelling the need for social concern over 
the decision-making processes, and the more justified potential state 
regulation.
  
Who are we to say that the decision to undergo IVF, even multiple 
times, is irrational?  How can we fault infertile patients for decisions 
made out of unhappiness, discontent, and frustration with a medical 
diagnosis that forecloses their ability to fulfill an ardent desire and life 
goal that fertile others—most of us—not only desire but accomplish 
so effortlessly?  How can we speak of all, most, or even many infertile 
patients as “desperate” or “obsessed” instead of determined, optimis-
tic, or courageous?  There is nothing inherently rational or irrational 
in an infertile woman’s decision to seek medical treatment.  Like de-
cisions made in other medical contexts by individuals whose compe-
tence is not questioned, it surely merits a strong presumption of ra-
tionality.  Instead, construing infertile women’s decisions to undergo 
treatment entails making subjective cultural judgments as to what 
kinds of desires deserve protection, and thus, necessarily, of whom we 
should protect.   
298
Let us assume for a moment the opposite of what I (and other 
legal scholars and social scientists in the abortion context) have ar-
gued thus far—that women often fail to appreciate the consequences 
  A reproductive decision that only affects the decision 
maker adversely is necessarily different from a decision that has nega-
tive implications on society as a whole.  One possible exercise is to 
contrast the societal impact of a pregnant woman’s potential failure 
to appreciate the nature of an abortion decision with the societal im-
pact of an infertile woman’s potential failure to understand what is at 
stake in pursuing fertility treatment.   
 
 297. See supra text accompanying note 182. 
 298. Cf. Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595, 599 (1995) 
(discussing government regulation of negative externalities from an economic stand-
point). 
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of an abortion decision.299  From a “pro-life” perspective, this failure 
could lead to at least two types of externalities: women choosing abor-
tion would have a negative emotional experience such as regret or 
trauma,300 and the decision would violate a moral baseline that some 
assume is universal.301
There appears to be a greater societal impact with respect to a 
woman’s failure to appreciate the nature of decision making in infer-
tility treatment.  Let us again assume the truth of a position rejected 
by this Article—that infertile women often fail to appreciate the na-
ture of ART treatment decisions.  In this context, others may have to 
share or bear the high financial and social costs of multiple pregnan-
cies and premature births, as well as the consequences of predatory 
providers who either manipulate success rates by cherry-picking pa-
tients or who accurately state success rates but do not inform patients 
with certain conditions that their IVF cycles will likely fail.  Here, 
however, a societal response would not have to be predicated on an 
infertile women’s failures as a decision maker or on her “irrationality” 
and need not even entail state regulation; instead, these issues can be 
(and currently are) addressed through other means such as medical 
board sanctions, legal claims involving fraud and malpractice,
  Both of these externalities are arguably invalid.  
A woman’s negative emotional experience is not a true externality be-
cause she makes the decision based (at least in part) on an internal 
assessment of how the abortion will affect her, and because she per-
sonally experiences these consequences.  In addition, the morality ex-
ternality is invalid because it is difficult to successfully argue that a 
universal moral baseline exists in contemporary American society. 
302 pro-
fessional medical association guidelines,303
 
 299. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 and health insurance re-
strictions such as limits on numbers of embryos transferred in a cycle.  
Crucially, as in the abortion context, the remaining (emotional and 
financial) consequences are largely borne by the infertile woman or 
 300. See supra text accompanying notes 94–99. 
 301. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 302. Physicians administering IVF treatment are “under the normal constraints of stan-
dard malpractice and tort liability.”  Note, supra note 53, at 2103.  Notably, however, “prov-
ing fraud or malpractice when a program presents somewhat misleading success-rate data 
may be difficult: the information is not an outright lie, but only an overly optimistic pres-
entation of accurate data.”  Id. 
 303. For example, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) estab-
lished the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (“SART”) in 1984 “as a kind of 
Phi Beta Kappa of IVF practitioners.”  Id. at 2104 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Most IVF programs in the United States are members of SART, which sets forth 
minimum guidelines and statistical reporting requirements in order to be a member.  Id. 
at 2104 n.69. 
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the infertile couple.  Although these consequences may be suboptim-
al from a societal standpoint, American society permits its citizens to 
make any number of suboptimal decisions as to how to spend their 
money and seek fulfillment (for example, by smoking or gambling), 
and it is difficult to see why infertility treatment should be any differ-
ent.   
This societal impact analysis provides an argument against fore-
closing certain choices altogether, not against all forms of regulation.  
One may envision many forms that ART regulatory schemes could 
take.  Some regulations would inevitably be explicitly autonomy-
enhancing, such as requirements that improve the quality of decision 
making through mandating that clinics provide patients with certain 
types of information, abide by informed consent regulations, and 
even provide informational counseling.  Notably, these autonomy-
enhancing obligations are imposed mostly upon institutions such as 
doctors and clinics, and not infertile patients themselves.  Other regu-
lations could be autonomy-assessing, in the sense that they mandate 
various means of evaluating individuals to see if they are truly making 
autonomous decisions, such as counseling that gauges infertility pa-
tients’ reasons for obtaining treatment.304  Nonetheless, we should be 
suspicious of autonomy-assessing restrictions because they may limit 
individuals’ choices.  These regulations are thus potentially proble-
matic but also necessary in some circumstances.  Finally, regulatory 
schemes could be autonomy-restricting by foreclosing certain choices 
altogether.  For instance, a state could enact a provision restricting 
the numbers of embryos that can be transferred in one IVF cycle.  
Ideally, these provisions should be somewhat flexible and based on 
medical necessity rather than hard and fast limitations on practitioner 
and patient autonomy.305
 
 304. See ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 302(d) (2008) (requir-
ing that “[t]he intended parents have undergone a mental health evaluation to determine 
their suitability to participate in collaborative reproduction” before undergoing certain 
ART procedures). 
  A provision restricting the number of em-
bryos transferred in one IVF cycle to the amount medically necessary 
is infinitely preferable to a strict limitation of two embryos per IVF 
cycle, which could tie the hands of both doctors and patients.  Of 
 305. The ASRM and SART have issued model guidelines to assist ART programs in de-
termining the appropriate number of embryos to transfer per IVF cycle.  AM. SOC’Y FOR 
REPROD. MED. & SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., Guidelines on Number of Embryos Trans-
ferred, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1518, 1518 (2009).  The guidelines are based on the suc-
cess rates of individual programs, the age of the patient, the age of the donor, the quality 
of the embryos, and the number of previous treatments the patient has undergone, among 
other factors.  Id. at 1518–19. Further, the guidelines allow for modification based on indi-
vidual circumstances and needs.  Id. at 1518. 
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course, there will inevitably be extreme cases, such as that of Nadya 
Suleman, that may warrant both autonomy-assessing and autonomy-
restricting regulations. 
It is important to acknowledge that people will at times make re-
productive decisions that many others perceive as “bad” or “irration-
al.”  These decisions may even be ones that the decision makers 
themselves will come to regret.  But this inevitability is inherent in the 
nature of human decision making and individual autonomy; imper-
fect humans will not always make perfect choices.  A suboptimal deci-
sion is not necessarily an incompetent decision, and democratic ideals 
compel extreme caution before we foreclose citizens’ ability to make 
certain choices for themselves.  We must continue to place a high val-
ue on individual autonomy (as our culture and Constitution do), par-
ticularly when deprivations are likely to reflect on gender stereotypes 
and will perpetuate these stereotypes and harm the individuals af-
fected by them.  Thus, it is unnecessary (and impossible) to prove that 
women always make rational reproductive decisions; instead, we must 
ensure that they have the autonomy to make those decisions, and that 
we accurately conceptualize autonomy so as to guarantee and maxim-
ize this freedom of choice.   
To these ends, we should reject a conventional individualistic 
conception of autonomy in favor of a more relational model of au-
tonomy.  Most conventional models of autonomy, including legal de-
finitions of competence, favor an individualistic perspective on au-
tonomy that prioritizes a person’s competency, which includes both 
soundness of mind and ability to make decisions free of coercion.306  
The focus here is not so much upon what decision an individual 
makes as it is upon her right to make the decision.307  Here, the deci-
sion maker is seen as distinct from communal and social influence.308
 
 306. See SHEILA A. M. MCLEAN, AUTONOMY, CONSENT AND THE LAW 17–20 (2010) (de-
scribing the traditional legal view of autonomy as one in which “[t]he individual is su-
preme, and once judged competent is entitled to make decisions on the basis of his or her 
own concerns and interests, subject only to the caveat that they do not harm third par-
ties.”; SUSAN H. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 42 (2004) (describing the traditional model of autonomy as one that 
requires choices to be made in the absence of coercion to be considered autonomous).  
For the most comprehensive discussion of relational autonomy, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, 
LAW’S RELATIONS:  A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011). 
  
Legal scholars who construe infertile women as desperate individuals 
whose decision-making processes are warped by emotional influence 
largely rely upon this individualistic perspective, which is not surpris-
 307. See MCLEAN, supra note 306, at 20; WILLIAMS, supra note 306, at 42.  
 308. MCLEAN, supra note 306, at 20; WILLIAMS, supra note 306, at 42–44. 
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ing given the dominance of this model in conventional legal thought 
and jurisprudence.  
A relational model of autonomy, however, recognizes that indi-
viduals as decision makers are embedded in social relations.309  The 
autonomous person “recognises his or her inter-relationship with the 
society of which s/he is a part and is able to acknowledge that his or 
her choices are socially constructed and have consequences for the 
community.”310  Autonomy is possible through, not despite, social inte-
raction.311  The relational perspective of autonomy acknowledges that 
individuals do not just make decisions on the basis of their own values 
and desires; there are “reasonable (and ethically justifiable) con-
straints on the excessive selfishness that individualistic autonomy 
would . . . have few, if any, means of preventing.”312  Autonomous de-
cisions are precisely those that the decision maker acknowledges are 
influenced by social obligations and responsibilities important to the 
decision maker.313
Finally, empirical research on exactly how and why infertile 
women make decisions in ART is an essential component of revising 
conventional understandings of emotion’s role in decision making 
and conceptions of autonomy.  To date, no qualitative or quantitative 
research has examined infertility patients’ actual informed consent 
experiences (though this author is currently involved in such a 
project).  Research on informed consent for medical procedures oth-
er than ART paints a dismal picture, finding evidence for poor pa-
tient comprehension of informed consent documents;
  Adopting a relational model of autonomy is an 
important step in acknowledging and accommodating emotion’s con-
tributions to decision making. 
314 patients who 
base medical decisions on fear, emotion, and religious beliefs instead 
of medically accurate information;315
 
 309. MCLEAN, supra note 
 and patients who prefer to defer 
to treating physicians’ recommendations rather than become exten-
sively informed about the details and risks of clinical care or intimate-
306, at 21. 
 310. Id.  
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 23. 
 313. Id.  
 314. See, e.g., Sanja Kusec et al., Improving Comprehension of Informed Consent, 60 PATIENT 
EDUC. & COUNS. 294, 298–99 (2006). 
 315. Dan W. Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, 
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1595, 1598 (1990). 
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ly included in medical decision making.316  Some legal scholars assert 
that ART patients do not understand the technical medical details in 
informed consent documentation and that patients’ ability to under-
stand and evaluate the forms is diminished by their desperation to 
conceive.317  Yet it is highly likely that typical informed consent con-
cerns (low comprehension or decision making based on inadequate 
information) do not apply in the expected manner within ART be-
cause ART consumers are different in critical ways from other pa-
tients for whom different informed consent practices might be justi-
fied—they are not elderly or sick, and on average have higher 
incomes and more education.318
IV.   CONCEIVING CHANGE: WHY CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFERTILE 
WOMEN MUST BE REFORMED 
  Accordingly, qualitative and quan-
titative research is urgently needed to fill a significant gap in the lite-
rature and to help shape emerging norms for ART decision making.   
Current constructions of infertile women in legal scholarship 
must be challenged and reformed lest they result in unnecessary and 
invasive alterations in treatment protocols, have stigmatizing effects, 
or reinforce paternalistic attitudes toward women and reproductive 
decision making. 
Legal scholars’ constructions of infertile women, their emotions, 
and their decision-making processes have important practical conse-
quences.  Scholars’ concern over the timing and pervasiveness of psy-
chological distress and therefore the absence of decision-making ca-
pacity is wide of the mark.319
 
 316. Kusec et al., supra note 
  Because clinical research suggests that 
only a minority of infertile women may be subject to psychological 
distress stemming from infertility treatments, beginning not at the in-
formed consent stage but after unsuccessful treatment, it is premature 
to focus on emotion’s effect upon decision making before the first 
314, at 297–99.  See also Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Pa-
tients’ Resistance to Risk Information in Genetic Counseling for BRCA1/2, 165 ARCH INTERNAL 
MED. 523, 523 (2005). 
 317. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 17, at 922–24 (“Patients beset by strong hopes and 
anxieties have difficulty absorbing medical information and rationally evaluating the risks 
and benefits of various treatment options.”). 
 318. See Margaret Ann Mille, The Fertility Center of Sarasota is One of About 350 Clinics Na-
tionwide Using Technology to Help Women Have Babies, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 
2000, Business Weekly Section, at 1 (discussing the high cost of IVF—which averages be-
tween $8,000 to $10,000 per attempt—and the attendant access problems for low-income 
women). 
 319. See supra Part II.A. 
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treatment cycle begins.320  Assessments of infertile women’s mental 
health are currently mandated, if at all, by industry guidelines and 
model acts.321  The American Society of Reproductive Medicine 
guidelines recommend that fertility clinic personnel include a “con-
sultant/mental health professional with expertise in reproductive is-
sues,”322 and fertility clinics interpret these guidelines to “require a 
psychological evaluation of each participant in any third-party repro-
duction prior to performing the medical procedures.”323  In addition, 
the American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology (“Model Act”) provides that all ART patients 
must undergo an initial “mental health consultation,” which entails a 
face-to-face meeting with a “licensed mental health professional for 
the purpose of educating the participants about the effects and po-
tential consequences of their participation in any ART procedure.”324  
The Model Act further provides that “[d]uring the consultation, the 
provider must offer additional counseling to each participant;” how-
ever, the participant is not required to accept additional counsel-
ing.325
To require more “protections” runs the risk of treating all infer-
tile women as subject to psychological distress.  Counselors can screen 
for mental health, identifying women most at risk for distress without 
undertaking more extensive, intrusive, and inefficient mental health 
inquiries.  Psychological evaluations are in danger of morphing into 
assessments of parental fitness, since distress could prompt labels anti-
  It is unnecessary to require infertile women to do more than 
meet with a counselor to discuss the potential link between unsuccess-
ful treatments and psychological distress, be notified of the availability 
of additional voluntary counseling, and provided other informed con-
sent details.   
 
 320. See supra text accompanying notes 196–197. 
 321. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New 
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 
203, 203 (2008). 
 322. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Revised Minimum Standards for Practices Offering Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S165, S165 (3d Supp. 2008), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_G
uidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/Revised_minimum_standards(1).pdf. 
 323. Kindregan & Snyder, supra note 321, at 216–17. 
 324. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECHNOLOGY § 301(1) (2008). 
 325. Id. § 301(2).  The Model Act also enumerates the qualifications necessary to be a 
“mental health professional,” and states that the result of the consultation may not be used 
to arbitrarily deny patients the right to procreate.  Id. §§ 301(3), 301(1). 
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thetical to society’s conception of “fit” potential parents: individuals 
who are stable, rational, and able to utilize sound judgment.326
In addition, the construction of infertile women as obsessed and 
desperate individuals has ideological consequences.  Such portrayals 
have become stock narratives, images that acquire cultural popularity 
and resonance as a result of being continuously produced and repro-
duced, and eventually become stereotypes, as did the Victorian hyster-
ic.  References to desperate infertile women and couples have ac-
quired great cultural significance.
 
327  Such stock narratives evolve into 
background cultural assumptions, and may be used as shortcuts when 
interpreting events and communicating ideas to others, working their 
way into judicial opinions, legislative regulation, and legal scholar-
ship.328  Legal scholars have contested similar stock narratives in the 
abortion context, criticizing the WPAA rationale as constraining 
women’s reproductive decision making and reproductive rights, in-
fringing on privacy and liberty interests, and interfering with self-
conceptions and life goals.  Instead, scholars have proffered alterna-
tive constructions of pregnant women, abortion, and reproductive 
decision making that emphasize bodily integrity, self-autonomy and 
accountability.329
Current constructions of infertile women as desperate, unrea-
sonable, or incapable of informed consent are influential stock narra-
tives that others impose on infertile women.
   
330
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 328. For a discussion of stock narratives and their use in cognitive processing, see Jody 
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 329. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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individuals’ lives, and resonate with other negative images of infertile 
women in popular culture, which already is populated with such ste-
reotypes that are based on traditional patriarchal views.331  In con-
temporary media, women famous for conceiving multiples after fertil-
ity treatment are portrayed as “irresponsible, narcissistic, possibly 
mentally unstable and, above all else, selfish.”332  Kate Gosselin, moth-
er to the twins and sextuplets featured on the popular Learning 
Channel reality show Jon and Kate Plus 8, has been variously described 
as bitchy, potentially unstable, greedy, and willing to sacrifice her 
children’s well-being for money and fame.333  Older women334 and 
young single women who conceive through IVF also have earned pub-
lic criticism.335  “Octomom” Nadya Suleman has been repeatedly de-
clared desperate and emotionally or mentally unstable.336
Unopposed by critical academic voices, these constructions will 
continue to dominate legal scholarship, influencing other scholars 
and lawmakers and becoming ever more stable and intransigent.  In-
corporated into judicial opinions and legal regulations, they could 
support regulations on ART.  A legal academic construction would 
therefore reinforce and legitimate mainstream social stereotypes, 
making the reaction to “Octomom” the norm rather than the excep-
tion.  Sensations such as “Octomom” likely have more of an influence 
on popular culture—perhaps even legal culture—than does legal 
academia, but there is little reason for allowing such constructions to 
persist.  Though ART is largely unregulated at present, it is unlikely to 
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remain so forever.337
The most immediate issue in the United States today is whether 
to place limits on the number of embryos to be implanted in a given 
IVF cycle.  Scholars rightly question whether fertility clinics have an 
incentive to transfer more embryos to increase the odds of success, 
given the success/failure reporting requirements of federal law.
  Part and parcel of developing an effective regu-
latory scheme will be identifying the fundamental values on which 
policies will be based, and scholarship must respond effectively to 
these stereotypes in order to prevent the law from reflecting them.  
Developing accurate constructions of infertile women is essential to 
defining these guiding values. 
338  
Fertility clinics in turn have redirected the blame toward patients, 
claiming that parents would prefer twins to decrease costs and com-
plete a family in a single pregnancy.339
Finally, and most importantly, these constructions will have nega-
tive effects upon infertile women themselves.  A widespread cultural 
belief that infertile women are irrational will hardly ease their social 
position, and may further lower self-perception and facilitate social 
misunderstanding.  Analyzing prejudice and stigma’s impact on 
members of stigmatized groups is not new; classics such as Gordon 
Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice and Erving Goffman’s Stigma: Notes on 
the Management of Spoiled Identity have inspired a profusion of re-
  Emphasis on the limits of ma-
ternal decision making may open the door to more extensive regula-
tion; if the legislation is part of a woman-blaming exercise rather than 
a realistic assessment of the commercial marketplace, the result may 
ultimately be unrealistic and ideologically driven, and may undermine 
better decision making.   
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search.340  Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson described how a widely 
known negative stereotype about a particular group that imperils its 
appearance of competence creates a “stereotype threat” when outsid-
ers can judge a group member’s behavior in terms of that negative 
stereotype.341  Stereotype threats may apply to any stigmatized group 
and are situation-specific.342  A threat is triggered when a group 
member realizes that a negative group stereotype can be applied and 
becomes anxious to disprove it, leading to distraction, self-
consciousness, overcautiousness, and frustration.343  It is not necessary 
that a group member internalize or even believe a stereotype for a 
stereotype threat to occur; the group member need only know that 
the stereotype exists and is applicable in a social situation.344
Perpetuating the negative stereotype that infertile women’s deci-
sion-making abilities are imperiled by distress, desperation, or obses-
sion may create a stereotype threat that, even if it is disbelieved and 
not internalized, renders them defensive, self-conscious, and anxious 
when fertility is socially salient.  A diagnosis of infertility implicates 
not only physiological failure but also mental dysfunction, even for 
fertile women undergoing treatment with infertile partners.  In-
creased self-consciousness, anxiety, and frustration can produce fur-
ther physiological consequences detrimental to conception.  Research 
documents a “mind-body” link in infertility; a 2009 study found that 
women who participated in stress management programs with relaxa-
tion training, cognitive-behavioral strategies, and group support were 
up to 160 percent more likely to become pregnant than women who 
did not.
   
345
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women, directly or indirectly, are the main source of infertility prob-
lems.”346
Moreover, these stereotypes may encourage infertile women and 
couples to subconsciously suppress stress in order to distance them-
selves from such negative images.
   
347  This may be detrimental to 
treatment outcome because “[s]tress can be considered a ‘healthy’ 
reaction (i.e., it is healthy to feel stressed in stressful situations), and it 
is a person’s style of coping with stressful situations that seems to be 
important in maintaining health.”348
Furthermore, stereotype threat may foster a culture of emotional 
deceit instead of emotional candor.  Koen Demyttenaere notes that 
“patients with infertility usually present with suppressed stress levels 
because they tend more than other patients to give socially desirable 
answers because they are afraid of being denied further treatment.”
  Patients who feel that they can-
not openly acknowledge their stress and distress are deprived of this 
significant coping mechanism.  Thus, this stereotype threat makes an 
already stressful experience even more taxing and may discourage ad-
vantageous coping practices, lowering odds of conception and enabl-
ing the invidious stereotype of infertile women as incapable decision 
makers to more directly affect the distribution of life opportunities—
the chances to conceive, birth, and raise children.  
349  
Other researchers have also concluded that infertility patients play 
roles they deem most appropriate, either exaggerating “desperation” 
to enhance access to treatment350 or not admitting to distress during 
counseling.351
influenced by dominant and authoritative discourses in 
terms of their ‘choices,’ and in terms of the explanations 
and meanings they give their social experiences and biologi-
cal identities.  They cannot ignore dominant and authorita-
tive discourses, and indeed they use aspects of them, reject 
others, and play a part in framing them . . . .
  There is little doubt that these constructions exert pro-
found influence; Letherby reports that her infertile respondents are  
352
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Patients could attempt to behave hyperrationally in order to dis-
tance themselves from mainstream cultural assumptions wedding in-
fertility to desperation and desperation to irrationality.  This under-
mines patients’ ability to make autonomous decisions in two ways.  
First, it undermines the trust and open communication integral to an 
effective patient-physician relationship by rendering it harder for pa-
tients to freely acknowledge and discuss fears, stress, and distress with 
their physicians.  As a result, patients may obtain less information cru-
cial to autonomous decision making.  Second, it makes it more diffi-
cult for clinic staff to identify outlier cases in which patients are expe-
riencing clinical distress, and thus complicates their obligation to ful-
fill informed consent obligations.  Under these conditions, it is doubt-
ful whether practitioners can accurately assess patients’ mental and 
emotional health during counseling sessions.   
On a related note, infertile women may also feel that they must 
comport with gendered stereotypes of the “ideal” infertility patient in 
order to obtain fertility treatment.  Social scientists have observed that 
infertility patients “display exaggerated stereotypical gender attributes 
at appropriate times during treatment, perhaps to signal their fitness 
to become heterosexual nuclear parents” and that “[p]atients had to 
act out these roles emotionally, economically, and legally to have 
access to treatments . . . .”353  Empirical research also suggests that an 
assertive infertile woman who either passively fails to comport with ex-
isting mainstream stereotypes or actively challenges negative charac-
terizations could be labeled by clinic personnel as “difficult” and “un-
cooperative,” and could even be refused treatment.354  Clinicians can 
determine who is and is not an ART candidate, placing the infertility 
patient “in the position of an object of scrutiny and classification by 
the physician.”355  After asking infertility physicians in Finnish public 
and private infertility clinics how they formed impressions of female 
patients, Maili Malin concluded that “[d]octors tend to inscribe cer-
tain value attributes to their patients, and their judgments materialize 
in the form of patient selection and treatment manners.”356  Malin’s 
respondents asserted that state of health, including mental state, is 
the initial factor in IVF patient selection.357
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upper class patients, “assertive consumers of medical treatment,” were 
seen as threats and disliked because they questioned physicians’ au-
thority.358  Physicians also believe “one has to be optimistic and coop-
erative for technological treatment to be successful,” and question 
whether “hostile, negative or depressed women [would] ever conceive 
either naturally or with the help of IVF.”359
In addition, infertile women may be unlikely to challenge inac-
curate constructions, since doing so might expose them to social iso-
lation.  For example, women who abort often do not feel comfortable 
informing others of their abortion to avoid social stigma:
   
360 
“[W]omen who have had an abortion may have good reason to fear 
being stigmatized—socially devalued, ostracized, and denigrated by 
others—if their abortion becomes known.”361  Furthermore, 
“[c]oncealing an abortion may prevent the loss of important social 
networks and preserve social support.”362  While perhaps less stigma-
tized than abortion, infertility treatments are still controversial,363 and 
admitting to infertility treatment is arguably stigmatizing and estab-
lishes one as “other.”364
Finally, stereotype threat also implicates another issue—
researchers of stigmatizing conditions often do not belong to such 
groups and therefore assume theoretical perspectives “uninformed by 
  Infertile women’s supposed emotionality may 
degrade the perceived quality and value of their critical voices, dilut-
ing their influence.   
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the lived experience of the people they study.”365  The result is that 
researchers may unwittingly misunderstand and misrepresent the 
lived experiences of stigmatized group members and maintain un-
substantiated assumptions.366
For better or worse, “reproductive medical practices and dis-
courses are an exercise in moral and social control.”
   
367  Just as in-
formed consent and embryo disposition forms are non-negotiable, 
forcing patients who disagree with terms to seek other providers, in-
fertile women who question or challenge psychological evaluation re-
sults could be “fired” from their clinics.368
V.  CONCLUSION: FROM WOMAN SCORNED TO WOMAN COMPETENT 
  The best solution is not 
prohibiting ART but empowering infertile women.  Two important 
steps toward more informed constructions of infertile women are ac-
knowledging the pivotal role that emotion can play in reproductive 
and medical decision making, and empirically assessing how women 
make decisions in ART contexts, investigating in particular the role of 
emotion. 
While clinical research recognizes that infertility can be emo-
tionally distressing,369 legal scholars have added additional and unne-
cessary normative overlays to craft demeaning constructions of infer-
tile women as emotional to the point of irrationality.370  The 
disparagement of infertile women, rooted in a physiological inability 
to conceive, sets off a chain of collapsing capacities.  Bodily failure ac-
tivates emotional frailty, jeopardizing rational decision making and 
imperiling informed consent.  Overemphasizing infertile women’s 
desperation or obsession with having children371
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larly inquiry into the infertility experience and portrays these women 
as creatures driven by blind instinct rather than as autonomous per-
sons with the will and capacity to pursue identified life goals, includ-
ing medical treatment.372
These constructions of infertile women have serious ideological 
and practical consequences.  They perpetuate emotional paternalism, 
and fail to recognize, respect, and accord legal weight to the dignity, 
autonomy, and capacity of infertile women.
   
373  They imply that infer-
tile women are somehow lesser decision makers, denying the very re-
productive autonomy and inherent potential for self-determination 
long celebrated in reproductive rights case law and scholarship.  
These images demean and trivialize not only the desire to conceive 
and beget a child but also the experience of raising the child—the 
same opportunity that jurists have long sought to protect in privacy, 
First Amendment, and fundamental rights jurisprudence.  Further-
more, such images may be used to justify restrictions on decision mak-
ing in ART.374  Although a pregnant woman’s right to choose abor-
tion is time-tested and an infertile woman’s right to elect treatment 
has not been established to the same extent, affirming a woman’s re-
productive freedom cannot be context-specific.375  Reproductive deci-
sion making is not just a veto on unwanted pregnancies; it encom-
passes the choice to conceive as well as the choice to not give birth.376  
In both cases, the determinations are deeply personal and political, 
involving emotions and bodily integrity, and they deserve the utmost 
respect.  Challenging and rehabilitating the portrayal of infertile 
women in legal scholarship is a powerful first step toward creating the 
“political and cultural conditions in which such technologies can be 
employed by women to shape the experience of reproduction accord-
ing to their own definitions.”377
Exposing the damaging institutional and individual conse-
quences of perpetuating inaccurate infertile women stereotypes is the 
first step toward evolving more accurate and empowering characteri-
zations.
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tended for good instead be used to perpetuate invidious patriarchal 
stereotypes.  Challenging constructions of infertile women accom-
plishes more than affirming reproductive decision making; it chal-
lenges a legal ideology, with significant ramifications in the broader 
context of women’s rights.  As Jennifer Nedelsky notes, to “routinely 
require special protective measures will not actually enhance women’s 
equality or autonomy. It keeps them in a kind of subordinate rela-
tionship requiring protection.”379
Law has already begun to build upon protectionist constructions 
of women as coerced or ineffective reproductive decision makers.  
Understanding the ideological development of such constructions is 
crucial for comprehending how legal constructions of women impact 
their legal rights, roles, and responsibilities.
 
380  After all, 
“[c]ompelling ideas, once unleashed and so influential as to become 
almost invisible, may be like tides that can sometimes take us to sur-
prising places.”381  Aggressive efforts to change such conceptions are 
underway in the abortion context, where these perceptions are en-
shrined in legal policy.382
In actuality, infertility is not a “master status”—the social factor 
that is an individual’s primary identifying characteristic.
  The struggle must continue in scholarship 
addressing infertility. 
383  One’s life 
does not stop with a diagnosis of infertility—bills must be paid, jobs 
performed, social obligations upheld, life lived—and fertility treat-
ments do not delimit the boundaries of an infertile woman’s daily ac-
tivities or life’s purpose.  Just because infertile women are determined 
to conceive does not mean that they are irrational and incapable of 
informed consent.  Rather, the lengths to which many go in research-
ing physicians and treatments and finding support among others like 
them indicates the opposite—that these women care so very deeply 
about not only conceiving, but about how best to conceive, that they 
prepare themselves as thoroughly as possible for reproductive deci-
sion making.384
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Nor do doctors usually welcome patients’ intense scrutiny into proce-
dures and success rates.385
Nonetheless, respect for reproductive decision making—and re-
spect for all women, whether fertile or infertile—demands that infer-
tile women be seen as capable, autonomous decision makers who are 
trying to assert control over their psychological and physical selves, 
and over their lives.  Indeed, “far from being mad, bad and desperate, 
involuntarily infertile women can be construed as survivors.  They are 
people who have had to confront loss, grief and feelings of failure.  
These women are agentic and rational subjects who usefully inform 
our thinking about motherhood and infertility.”
   
386
Where can we turn to find more accurate constructions?  Empir-
ical research on infertile women’s experiences likely holds the key to 
forming more accurate constructions; what little qualitative research 
exists suggests that infertile women contextualize desperation or ob-





  Infertile women must be seen as women making reproductive 
choices that they authentically desire, have carefully considered, and 
have freely chosen.  Pending the arrival of compelling new views of 
infertile women as competent decision makers, however, we must 
continually question portrayals of infertile women and the judgments 
that such discourse may produce.  Infertile women must not be seen 
as passive victims, but as active, circumspect participants in their 
treatment.  To offer a modern variation on Descartes, infertile women 
think clearly, therefore they are.  But if they are not believed to think 
clearly, then they are not.  And others will abrogate their right to 
think.   
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